The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement by Ehrenzweig, Albert A.




The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement
Albert A. Ehrenzweig
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ehrenzweig, Albert A., "The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement" (1951).




Journal of the State Bar Association
Volume 36 December, 1951 Number L
THE PLACE OF ACTING IN INTENTIONAL MULTISTATE
TORTS: LAW AND REASON VERSUS THE RESTATEMENT
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG*
440 LIABILITY without fault" was the principle on which judges
and writers of the last century based what they thought to be
a highly moralized law of torts. Though this principle is still with us,
it has long since been deprived of its "moral" meaning. 'hether
ytu have been hit by an automobile, whether you have crushed
your finger in the door of a railroad car or contracted indigestion
from the consumption of spoiled food, you are likely to assert that
somebody was at fault, and to claim damages for the "negligent"
causation of your injury. In my study on "Negligence without
Fault"' I have attempted to show that many of the theoretical and
practical difficulties of our present tort law can perhaps be solved by
the conscious segregation of those "negligence" liabilities serving
primarily compensation for harm inflicted by unavoidable incidents
of modern mechanical enterprise rather than the censure and
admonition of a wrongdoer. To follow some of the implications of
this thesis for the conflicts rules governing the law of torts is the
iihject of this paper.
So manifold are the situations and problems here involved that
comparison and understanding of their analysis will perhaps be
assisted by the introduction of a set of symbols: (A) In "single
contact" cases where both the causal conduct and the harm caused
have occurred at one "place of wrong," the choice is limited to one
*Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (U. of Calif.
Press, 1951). See also this writer's Note, Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negli-
gence: A New Interpretationr of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 729
(1941) ; Products Liability for Breach of Warranty and Negligence, N. Y.
Law Rev. Comm. Reports (1943), Leg. Doc. No. 65(J); Assurance Oblige
-4 Comparative Study, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 445 (1950); Schuld-
haftung im Schadenersatzrecht (Vienna, 1931); Zur Eriwuerung des
Schadowrsat-arechtes (Vienna, 1937); Versicherung als Haftungsgrund, 72
Juristische Blaetter 253 (Vienna 1950) : El Seguro Obliga, 3 Boletin Del In-
stituto De Derecho Comparado De Mexico 3 (1950).
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between the law of that place (lex loci, X) and the law of the forum
(lex fori, F). The symbols designate application of the lex fori re-
sulting in liability (FL) or nonliability (FN), or application of the
lex loci resulting in liability (XL) or nonliability (XN). (B) In
multiple contact cases (multistate torts) the defendant's conduct
(C) and the plaintiff's harm (H) have occurred in different states.
Since one of these is quite regularly the state of the forum, the
analysis will be limited to the choice between the law of the forum
as that of the place of harm (FH) or conduct (FC) and the law
of a foreign place of harm (XH) or conduct (XC). The symbols
designate application of the lex fori as the law of the place of con-
duct resulting in liability (FCL) or nonliability (FCN), or as the
law of the place of harm resulting in liability (FHL) or non-
liability (FHN) ; and application of the lex loci as the law of the
place of conduct resulting in liability (XCL) or nonliability (XCN),
or as the law of the place of harm resulting in liability (XHL) or
nonliability (XHN).
At a time when tort law was mainly concerned with moral
wrongs, courts in conflicts cases quite naturally stressed the place
of the defendant's wrongful conduct as that whose law he could most
properly be expected to obey. Once and where, however, the proper
allocation of losses came to cause more concern than the righting of
wrongs; once and where, in other words, the tort rule applied was
primarily compensatory rather than admonitory, the place of loss
seemed more significant than that of the defendant's conduct. It
was this consideration which apparently induced the Restaters of
the law of conflicts to adopt a general rule based on what is now
usually referred to as the "place of harm." I will try to show that
this generalization, with its underlying failure to distinguish be-
tween the new compensatory "quasi-strict" liabilities and what
has remained of the admonitory fault liability of the pre-industrial
era, accounts for much of that confusion of theory and language
(now prevailing) in the conflicts law of torts, which only recently
has caused an eminent writer to postulate the "give-it-up" theory
of a "proper law of torts."
2
2. Mforris, The Proper Law of Torts, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
Against a similar tendency in Scandinavian law see Malmstroem, Till Fragan
o2 Skadestand utanfoer Kontrakisfoerhallanden inom den 1nternationella
Privatraetten, Festkrift til Professor Ussing 362 (1951). Cf. The Irma-
Mignon, Norsk Rettstidende 1923 II, 58, Malmstroem, id. at 368 (Nor-
wegian law applied in Norway to a collision between Norwegian boats in
England) ; in contrast to Nytt Jurisdiskt Arkiv 1936, p. 291, ibid English




The question whether the place of harm rule of the Restatement
will ultimately prove to be the best rule for liabilities without fault
or will have to be replaced by different rules for different torts or
fact situations is outside the scope of this paper. What I am attempt-
ing to prove is that the Restatement rule, contrary to the conviction
of its authors, is not one of general, logically required, application.
This will appear from the fact that the Restatement rule has not
been, and should not be, adopted by the courts with regard to what
has remained of liability for "moral" fault. Since the policies pre-
dominant in this field are most clearly apparent in intentional torts,
these torts have been chosen as the principal object of this paper.
The case of Gordon v. Parker3 offers an appropriate starting
point. A domiciliary of Pennsylvania sued in the federal court in
Massachusetts for the alienation of his wife's affections by acts
committed in the state of the forum. Defendant moved for a sum-
mary judgment under a Pennsylvania statute barring actions of
this type and alleged to be applicable as the law of the place where
the defendant's act had "its chief and indeed its final consequences."-,
The defendant's position seemed fully supported by the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws according to which recovery depends on whether
..a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong" (Section
384), i.e. "where the last event necessary to make an actor liable
for an alleged tort takes place" (Section 382). 5 Since a "tort is
3. Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (Mass. 1949), aff'd on. other
grounds, 178 F. 2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949). For comments see 1 Stafi. L. Rev.
759 (1949) ; 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1949).
4. Gordon v. Parker, supra note 3, at 42.
5. This rule is circuitous in several respects. Neither the existence of
a "wrong" nor the "last event" can be ascertained without reference to a
*;pecific law the applicability of which is the very issue to be determined under
k§ 382 and 384. Cf. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws 328 (1942) ; Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws 46 (1936); 2 Rabel,
Conflict of Laws 232, 235 (1947) (with references to foreign laws) ; Freund,
Book Review, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1264, 1265 (1948); Lorenzen, Selected
Articles on the Conflict of Laws (1947) ; Kuratowski, Torts, in Private
International Law, 1 Int. L. Q. 172 (1947) ; Lewald, Rigles Ginirales des
Conflits de Lois, 69 Recueil Des Cours 5, 82 (Acad6mie de Droit Inter-
national, 1939). For a case involving this problem see MXountain v. Price,
20 Wash. 2d 129, 146 P. 2d 327 (1944). Cf. [1944] Ann. Sur'. Am. L. 60.
As a counsel of despair some writers have expressly advocated application of
the lex fori at this point. Raape, Internationales Privatrecht 364 (3d ed.
1950) ; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 78 (1940);
Overton, Analysis in Conflict of Laws: The Problem of Classification, 21
Tenn. L. Rev. 600, 607 (1951).
Presumably conscious of the insoluble difficulty, Professor Beale limited
himself in the Restatement to an informal Note purporting to summarize
the rules which "represent the general common law as to what constitutes the
place of wrong in different types of torts." Restatement, Conflict of Laws
455 (1934). Whether or not we can concede the existence of such a "general
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complete only when the harm takes place,"" the Restaters would
apply the law of "the place where the person or thing harmed is
situated at the time of the wro:ag." If the Massachusetts court had
followed this rule, it would probably have felt compelled to apply
the law of plaintiff's individual or matrimonial domicile8 as that
of the place of the harm to hi3 interest in the affections or in the
services of his wife.0 Judge WVyzanski, however, in a brilliant
opinion, denied the defendant's motion, holding applicable the law
of Massachussets as the law of the state in which the defendant's
reprehensible conduct had concededly occurred.10
Much of the court's reasoning in support of this conclusion is
unconvincing. We find the argument that Pennsylvania herself had
not intended to extend her policy beyond her borders," and that,
even if she had, this was "not a situation in which the interests
of Pennsylvania plainly outweigh those of Massachusetts. ' 12 Here
as so often in the law of conflicts legislative "intention" and state
"interests" are used to restate the desired results. However, the
common law," courts following the theory of the Restatement will resort
to Professor Beale's treatise, recognized and relied on as the authoritative
commentary on the Restatement. See infra note 7.
6. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 263 (3d ed. 1949).
7. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 377.2 (1935). Similarly Restatement,
Conflict of Laws § 411 (Draft of September 14, 1927, C. L. No. 20-R)
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 411 (Tent. Draft of April 26-28, 1928);
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 411 (P.F.D. No. 3, 1932).
8. That this place would have been considered as that of the harm seems
likely in view of the Massachusetts rule which requires either adultery or
separation for the tort of alienation of affections. McGrath v. Sullivan, 303
Mass. 327, 21 N. E. 2d 533 (1933), referred to by the court in Gordon v.
Parker, spra note 3, at 41. See also A. v. B., BGE 43 II, 309 (Swiss
Supreme Federal Court, 6.15.1917), also referred to by the Massachusetts
court (infra note 130). at 315. For a recent reexamination of the concept
of "consortium" see Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir.
1950):
9. Restatement, Torts § 683, Comment (1938). See also Prosser, Torts
916 (1941) with authorities.
10. Gor-don v. Parker, supra note 3.
11. Id., at 43. But cf. O'Connor v. Johnson, 74 F. Supp. 370, 378
(W.D. N.Y. 1947) where the New York court dismissed a complaint for
breach of promise to marry, holding a similar New York statute to be a
clear and emphatic expression of New York legislative policy "against the
maintenance of such an action as this, whether the cause of action arose
within or without the state." Accord, Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 F. Supp. 156 (Mass.
1944).
12. Gordon v. Parker, supra note 3, at 42. On "Heart Balm" statutes
in general see Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Bal," 33 Mich. L.
Rev. 979 (1935) ; Kane, Heart Baln and Public Policy, 5 Ford. L. Rev. 63
(1936) ; Wright, The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10 Va.
L. Rev. 361 (1924). See also infra note 200.
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court itself does not seem satisfied with these arguments and pro-
ceeds to examine purpose and function of the tort rule invoked.
In the tort of alienation of affections, the court finds, "the prin-
cipal reason why the state stamps conduct as wrongful is that so
many people regard it as sinful, so many regard it as offensive to
public morals." Here, the "compensatory element," always present
in tort law, "is of secondary consequence" and tort law fully re-
flects its relationship to "its younger brother, criminal law."'13
Clearly and unambiguously judge Wyzanski thus draws a line be-
tween two types of torts, those being primarily "compensatory" in
character and perhaps properly subject to the now traditional place
of harm rule and those, which, like the tort of alienation of affec-
tions, being primarily admonitory, require the application of the
law of that state in which the "sinful," wrongful conduct has
occurred.
It will be shown that most, if not all, court decisions involving
intentional torts can be rationalized under a rule referring to the
place of the defendant's wrongful conduct. W11hile this finding de-
feats the general applicability of the Restatement rule (FHL, FHN,
XHL, XHN), it does not prove the desirability of a general "con-
duct rule" for fault liability (FCL, FCN, XCL, XCN). Notwith-
standing high authority to this effect, 4 it may be doubtful whether
liability for an intentional tort, though recognized under the law
of the place of harm, should always be denied merely because the
defendant had acted under a law not imposing such liability (FCN,
XCN . In such a situation it may be a better solution to allow
the plaintiff to recover if liability is imposed under the law of either
the place of conduct or of the place of harm. But this much is cer-
tain: American courts have always given, and ought to give,
preference to the law of the place of conduct over that of the place
Of harm, if the former (though not the latter) renders the de-
fendant liable for an intentional tort. This is true whether or not
the forum itself is the place of conduct (FCL, XCL). But since in
the case of a foreign place of conduct, the forum's public policy will
often modify this result particularly where the forum is also
the place of harm (FHN v. XCL), the thesis of the present paper
is limited to the proposition, exemplified by Gordon v. Parker,
that when in an intentional tort the defendant's conduct has occurred
13. Gordon v. Parker, siupra note 3, at 42. See also Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws § 428 (1934).
14. See infra text at note 48.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
within the state of the forum, and under this law there is liability,
the defendant will be held liable even though the harm was sustained
in a state which would not impose liability under its local law
(FCL). This result alone should be sufficient to reveal the errone-
ousness of the Restaters' place of harm rule as a general "logical"
principle, and open the way for the needed functional analysis of the
conflicts rules as to each of those numerous types of civil liability
which, largely by historical accident, have come to be lumped to-
gether under the heading of tort law.
In view of the seemingly prevailing opinion to the contrary, the
testing of this thesis on principle and authority must be preceded
by a critical examination of the historical and functional foundations
of the entire conflicts law of torts. To prove the original, "moral"
meaning of the "place of wrong" rule, it will be shown (1) how
torts, having originally, like crimes, been exclusively governed by
the lex fori; (2) came to follow the law of the "place of wrong"
(lex loci) as to the recognition of both (a) defenses and (b) causes
of action. (3) To explain the shift, effected within this rule and
rationalized under various dogmatic formulas, from the place of
acting to that of the harm both as to (a) defenses and (b) causes
of action, the impact will be examined on the law of conflicts of the
growing need for compensation for industrial accidents innocently
inflicted and thus unaffected by "moral" policies peculiar to the
law of the place of defendant's conduct. It will appear that (4) the
courts' refusal to extend this shift to torts continuing to be based
on the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct, has made imperative.
with certain exceptions and modifications, the recognition of at
least two distinct conflicts rules in the field of multistate torts. That
courts have in fact recognized this need will be shown in the final
chapter of this paper which (5) contains an analysis of the authori-
ties bearing on the conflicts law in intentional multistate torts.
1. The Lex Fori (FL and FN)
For several centuries English courts had chosen generally to
avoid foreign contacts by refusing to take jurisdiction as to any
case involving a "fait en une estraunge terre."' 5 Even when it be-
15. Anon., 17 Selden Society 110 (from Fitzherbert, Obligacion 15
[Edward II, 1308]. As to the contemporaneous conflicts law of France which
recognized the lex loci commissi actus see the decisions of 'May 6, 1379 and
October 14, 1414 in Le Droit Coutumier de Cambrai (ed. Meijers and de
Bl&ourt, Haarlem 1933) 66, 81, cited Meijers, L'Histoire dos Principes
Fondamentaux du Droit International Privj ii Partir du Moyen Age. 49
Recueil Des Cours 547, 588 (Academie de Droit International, 1934).
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came clear from Lord Mansfield's decision in the case of Mostyn v.
Fabrigas0 that such jurisdiction would lie, the courts were able to
dispense with conflicts rules by applying the law. of England to the
foreign tort. In a modified form, restated in the celebrated case of
Phillips v. Eyre'7 which permitted the defendant to "justify" him-
self under the law of the place of his conduct, this practice has re-
mained unchanged both in England and in Canada up to the present
time.18 In Continental Europe, too, the lex fori, having displaced the
law of nationality, has had much weight.19 Thus, the French practice
prohibiting la reserche de la paternit6 even as to children con-
ceived in countries recognizing a tort of illegitimate intercourse, in-
duced Savigny to postulate general application by the forum of its
own tort law.2' Other German, French, and Swiss writers have
expressed similar views.2' And the Soviet Supreme Court ruled in
1941 that "the law of the place of trial (lex fori) shall be applied"
to tort claims.22 The same rule was the law of Greece until the
16. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774), fre-
quuntly relied upon in early American decisions. See e.g., Whitford v.
Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465, 475 (1861).
17. Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] L. R., 6 Q. B. 1. Besides the current Eng-
lish texts (Dicey, Graveson, Schmitthoff, Wolff) see Wortley, The General
Principles of Private International Law from the English Standpoint, 71
Reccuil Des Cours 5, 58 (Academie de Droit International, 1947). See also
Art. 11 of the Japanese statute of 1898 (Ho-rei) ; Meili, International Civil
and Commercial Law 362 (trans. Kuhn, 1905); Egawa, Private Interna-
tional Law as it is Studied in Japan, Japan Science Review, Law and
Politics, No. 1, 60, 61 (1950).
18. See Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws 15 et seq. and
passin (1947); Dicey's Conflict of Laws 799 et seq. (6th ed. 1949). The
rule has found support [ef. Schmitthoff, A Textbook of the English Conflict
of Laws 147 (2d ed. 1948)1 as well as criticism [ef. Robertson, The Choice
of Law for Tort Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 4 2fod. L. Rev. 27, 43
(1940) ] and has recently been repudiated in Scotland. M'Elroy v. M'Allister,
[1949] Scots. L. T. 139; infra note 43.
19. See in general 2 Schnitzer, Internationales Privatrecht 596 (3d
ed. 1950).
20. Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 205 (transl. Guthrie,
Edinburgh, 1869). The resulting danger of "forum shopping" he considered
as "the inevitable result of the particular nature of this class of laws." Id. at
207. For further references see Lewald, Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht
260 (1931); Simons, La Conception du Droit International Privi d'apr~s
la Doctrine et la Pratique en Allemagtw, 15 Recueil Des Cours 437 (Acad6-
mie de Droit International, 1926).
21. See Waechter, Archiv Fuer Die Civilistische Praxis 25, 389; Wyss,
Zeitschrift Fuer Schweizerisches Recht IV, 95; Mazeaud, Trait6 Thforique
et Pratique De La Responsabilit6 Civile §§ 2075-5 et seq. (1950) ; 1 Arminjon,
Prcis De Droit International Priv6 No. 120 (1947) ; see also the decision
of the Appellate Court of Berne of May 5, 1892, Z. 3, 194. Frankenstein's
rather isolated plea for the law of nationality could not be considered for
interstate delicts in this country. See 2 Frankenstein, Internationales Privat-
recht 362 (1929). See also infra note 47.
22. 2 Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 14 (1949).
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recodification of 194623 and has found recognition in German
legislation.2"
Although resort to the lex fori in tort cases has occasionally been
advocated in this country, too,2 American courts, but for isolated
traces of declined jurisdiction 26 and "justification," 27 have never
in terms adhered to the English approach, except perhaps when deal-
ing with torts committed abroad or on the high seas.s Yet, there
is reason to assume that these courts, too, have considered the lex
fori as the law primarily applicable in torts cases. Story, rejecting
attempts of foreign jurists to construct a complete and consistent
system of conflicts law,29 failed to include torts among those fields
(personal status, contracts, property and succession) in which in-
ternational tradition had come to recognize foreign "sovereignty
and jurisdiction. ' 30 Tort claims, considered as essentially penal,
were subjected to the lex fori under the heading of either criminal
23. Article 6 of the Civil Code of 1856, said to be the only "legislative
text ever to adopt the theory of the law of the forum advocated by Savigny."
Nicoletopoulos, Private International Law in the New Greek Civil Code, 23
Tulane L. Rev. 452, 470 (1949). This provision has now been replaced by
Article 26 of the New Code referring to the place of the wrong (interpreted to
be identical with the place of acting. Nicoletopoulos, supra at 470). See in
general Streit, La Conception du Droit International Pri1, en Grace, 20
Recueil Des Cours 5 (Academic de Droit International, 1927).
24. Art. 12 of the German Introductory Law to the Civil Code (E.G.
D.B.G.) ; Decree of Dec. 7, 1942 R. G. B1. I 706 [held obsolete by Raape,
Internationales Privatrecht 364 (3d ed. 1950)]. Cf. Frankenstein, op. cit.
supra note 21, at II, 375; 2 Rabel, op. cit. supra note 5, at 246, n. 69; Diena,
La Conception du Droit International Privt, d'apris la Doctrine et [a
Pratique en Italie, 17 Recueil Des Cours 347, '385 (Acad~mie de Droit
International, 1927).
25. M. Rh. (fax Rheinstein), 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 111, 113 (1945).
26. Cf. Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316 (N.Y. 1859). The New York
court, rejecting two cases to the contrary as badly reasoned [Walls v.
Thomas, 2 Bibb. 458 (Ky. 1802); Smith v. Bull, 17 Wend. 323 (N.Y.
1837)], refused to take jurisdicticn in an action for assault committed in
California in 1856 by the "San Francisco Vigilance Committee": "No case
will be found in the whole course of English jurisprudence in which an
action for an injury to the person, inflicted by one foreigner upon another
in a foreign country, was ever held to be maintainable in an English court"
(at 329). See also Great Western R. R. of Canada v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305
(1869) maintaining that American courts will not take jurisdiction in law
suits between aliens on a foreign tort.
27. See Shaver v. White and Dougherty, 6 funf. (20 Va.) 110, 112
(1818).
28. See, e.g., Stewart's Adm'x v. Bacon, 253 Ky. 748, 70 S. W. 2d 522
(1934) (wrongful death in Ontario) with further references at 70 S. W.
2d 523; Robinson, Admiralty 836 (1939) ; infra note 46.
29. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 27 (1834).
30. Id. at 19. The first edition (1834) omits torts entirely and even the
fourth edition (1852) limits itself to the discussion of torts committed on
the high seas, always a special field of investigation within the law of
admiralty, and to the incidental discussion of the enforcement of penal
claims. Id. at 1016.
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law or remedies. Indeed, as long as tort law was primarily common
law and thus presumed to be identical in all states of the Union, there
was little need for developing a law of conflicts in this field. 3'
Quite possibly this need was brought home to American courts
by the codification of the law of Louisiana3 2 and it may not be a
coincidence that the first American text on conflicts was written
in 1820 by an attorney practicing in that state.'3 But soon increasing
legislative action and growing interstate commerce compelled at-
tention, too, to the increasing differences between the laws of other
states.
In a period in which statutes were considered as encroachments
upon the common law, it seemed unfair to impose statutory liability
for wrongs committed outside the territory of the legislating state.
In this country, as in England, this problem appeared first in
jurisdictional contests as to the actionability or "transitory" nature
of foreign torts.34 Once this question was settled in the affirmative,
American conflicts theory apparently refusing to follow English
authority and lacking American precedent,35 turned to foreign learn-
ing to justify the substitution of the law of the "place of wrong"
for the lex fori, both as to foreign defenses and foreign claims.
2. Place of Wrong (Lex Loci)
(a) Nonliability under the lex loci (XN). In one of the earlier
cases the New York court, holding a wrongful death statute in-
31. The same reason may account for the rule of § 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 which fails to mention the common law in its rule on the ap-
plicability of state law in the federal courts. Only when judicial activity had
increased diversity between the common laws of the several states, did a
problem arise which as late as 1938 was solved in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins
by what amounts to judicial legislation equalizing the treatment of statute
and common law.
32. See Dennick v. R. R., 103 U. S. 11, 18 (1880).
33. Livermore, Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the
Contrariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations (New
Orleans, 1820).
34. As early as 1818, it was settled in Virginia that actions upon "per-
sonal injuries committed anywhere" could be brought in that state. Shaver
v. White and Dougherty, supra note 27, at 112. But see Minor, Conflict of
Laws 476, 478 n. 3, 4 (1901). The problem is still very much alive in the
law governing the delimitation of admiralty jurisdiction. See Robinson,
Admiralty 76 et seq. (1939).
35. It is perhaps significant for the dearth of authority that three of
the five cases relied on by the Supreme Court in the Dennick case (supra
note 32) [Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102 (1834) ; Ex parte Van Riper, 20
Wend. 614 (N.Y. 1839); Great Western R. R. of Canada v. Miller, 19
Mich. 305 (1869) ; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119 (1871) ; N. & C. R. R. v.
Sprayberry, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxter) 341 (1874)] fail to support the holding.
In the Lowry and Pickering cases the holding was for defendant under the
lex fori and in the Miller case the Court established a forum non conveniens
doctrine for suits on foreign torts between foreigners.
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applicable to a tort committed outside the state,0 relied on a quota-
tion from Story's treatise according to which the laws of a country
"can have no intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except within the terri-
torial limits and jurisdiction of that country," 37 an often repeated
statement adopted almost literally from Boullenois" and traced
back, by Story himself, to the rule of the Digest according to which
one may with impunity disregard the law pronounced by a magistrate
beyond his territory.' The same New York case further justifies
its refusal to apply its own statute to foreign facts by referring to
the partly penal character of that statute.4 0 This equally legalistic
reasoning is at least as old as Bartolus' fourteenth century conflicts
theory 4' of the "law of delicts," then still part of the law of crimes,
under which a foreigner committing a tort in the state of the
forum should in fairness be held only if his wrongful act was "com-
monly prohibited by all cities" and not excusable by ignorance of
the law.4 2 A fortiori, he would have been free of liability had his act
been committed abroad under a law not holding him accountable.
It was in this form of a requirement of "concurrent actionability"
that the place of wrong rule was recently modified in Scotland.'2
Both the "extraterritoriality" and the "penality" exceptions
from the lex fori, while underlying one of the earliest conflicts rules
36. Beach v. The Bay State Steamboat Co., 30 Barb. 433 (N.Y. 1859) ;
Whitford v. Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465 (1861). See also McCarthy v.
Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R. R., 18 Kan. 46 (1877) ; Vandeventer v.
New York and New Haven R. R., 27 Barb. 244 (N.Y. 1857); Needham
v. Grand Trunk R. R., 38 Vt. 294 (1865) ; Hancock, op. cit. supra n. 13, at 23.
37. Story, Commentaries on the Conflicts of Laws 7 (1834). Cf. the
similar language in Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102 (1834).
38. Story's citation of 1 Prin. Gen. 6, p. 4, apparently refers to the first
volume of the Trait6 De La Personalit6 Et De La Realit6 Des Lois, Cou-
tumes, Statuts, Par Forme D'Observations. Cf. Arminjon, Les Systeines
Juridiques Complexes et les Conflits de Lois et de Jurisdiction auxquels ils
Donzent Lieu, 74 Receuil Des Cours 79, 89 (Academie de Droit Interna-
tional, 1949), with a magnificent comparative discussion of the conflicts laws
of the world.
39. Dig. 2, 1, 1, 20.
40. Beach v. The Bay State Steamboat Co., supra note 36 at 440.
41. On the law prior to Bartaus, see 2 Neumeyer, Die Gemeinrechtliche
Entwicklung Des Internationalen Privat-Und Strafrechts Bis Bartolus 66,
138 (Muenchen, Schweitzer, 1916' ; also 3 Niboyet, Droit International Priv6
Francais 44 (1944); Meijers, L'Histoire des Principes Fondamentaux di
Droit International Priva i Partir di Moyen, Age, 49 Recueil Des Cours 547
(Academie de Droit International, 1934).
42. Bartolus, Commentaria 24, 57 (transl. Beale, Bartolus on the Con-
flict of Law, 1914).
43. M'Elroy v. M'Allister, [1949] Scots L. T. 139. See comments by
Schmitthoff, Torts Committed Abroad, 27 Can. B. Rev. 816 (1949) ; Morris,
12 Mod. L. Rev. 248 (1949); Rankin, 61 Jurid. Rev. 61 (1949) ; Walker,
Delicts and Conflict of Laws, [1950] Scots L. T. 209; Gow, 65 L. Q. Rev.
313 (1949) ; Ehrenzweig, Alternative Actionability in the Conflict of Laws
of Enterprise Liability, 63 Jurid. Rev. 39 (1951).
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as well as the modern Scots rule, still imply recognition of the law
,,f the forum as that primarily applicable in tort cases. And, indeed,
as late as 1875, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, though relying on
doubtful authority, 44 could call the principle that a personal injury
action is governed by the lex fori, "almost too familiar... for discus-
sion or authority."' But what may have started as an exemption
from liability statutes of defendants excused by the common law of
the place of acting, soon became a general principle of conflicts law,
compelling the "application" of foreign nonliability rules without
regard to whether the forum rule invoked by the plaintiff was one
of common or statute law.4" This principle, widely recognized, 47 has
thus been phrased and rationalized as required by fairness to the
tortfeasor in Mr. justice Holmes' classic statement in the American
Baiana case: ". . . the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done. . . . For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions
rather than those of the place where he did the acts . . . would be
unjust. . .. "48
44. Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338 (N.Y. 1817) (contract and
penalty) ; Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84 (1806) (statute of limitations) ;
Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562, 632 (1860) (legislative abolition of foreign
status of slavery).
45. Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R., 37 Wis. 321, 322 (1875).
But c. MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, 110 Wis. 113, 85 N. W. 707 (1901).
46. See Story, Conflict of Laws 703 (4th ed. 1852). But two exceptions
were recognized by Mr. Justice Holmes in the American Banana case, infra
note 48 at 355, deeming the lex fori applicable where the place of wrong is
situated (1) "in regions subject to no sovereign," e.g., on the high seas, or
(2) in regions subject "to no law that civilized countries would recognize as
adequate." As to similar foreign rules see 2 Schnitzer, Handbuch Des Inter-
nationalen Privatrechts 546 (1950) ; 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 244 (1947).
Recent political events have given increased importance to the second rule,
though the line of demarcation remains subject to change. Cf. e.g., Salimoff
v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933) (denying
to the original owner recovery against the purchaser of oil land confiscated
by the Soviet government) ; Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [1902] A. C. 176
(lawful seizure of British goods by Sultan of Muscat).
47. See Meili, International Civil and Commercial Law 258 et seq.
(transl. Kuhn, 1905). The theory supported by Savigny and Waechter (supra
notes 20, 21) that the lex fori should govern because of "the strongly ethical
and coercive nature" of tort claims further stresses the admonitory, quasi-
criminal rationale underlying the classical conflicts approach in the law
of torts. Id. at 239. See also Bar, Das Internationale Privat-Und Strafrecht
317 (1862); 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 236 (1947); Velasquez, Directivas
Fundamentales Del Derecho Internacional Privado Puertorriqueno 62 (1945).
48. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
See also Justice Holmes' opinions in Walsh v. New York and New England
R. R., 160 Mass. 571, 36 N. E. 584 (1894); Slater v. Mexican National
R. R., 194 U. S. 120 (1904); and, relying on Justice Holmes' argument,
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 272 App. Div. 246, 70
N. Y. S. 2d 697 (1st Dept. 1947).
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(b) Liability under the le- loci (XL). Like the recognition of
foreign defenses, the "enforcement of foreign tort claims" was prob-
ably first litigated in American courts with regard to those dis-
crepancies between the laws of the several states which had been
created by statutes such as those governing wrongful death or corpo-
rate liability. But since the place of wrong rule was primarily
designed to protect the defendant, recognition of foreign defenses
seemed for a long while "more pressing than the recognition of
foreign claims ;-149 and courts, though quite willing to substitute
foreign nonliability for their own liability rule, were often reluctant
to recognize tort claims based on foreign law. Many were the ways
in which this reluctance with its preference for the lex fori ex-
pressed itself.
True, rejection of foreign statutes as penal50 or lacking extra-
territorial effect 5' was soon abandoned as "indefensible. '"52 Similarly,
occasional references to the remedial nature of statutory tort
claims found early opposition."3 But the same preference for the
lex fori, as expressed in these obsolete theories, may be found in the
later, and still persisting, requirement that a foreign statute to be
applicable must be similar to, or at least not substantially dissimilar
from, the lex fori.54 While modern courts are reluctant to admit
49. Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 57 (1942). Cf. Kuhn, La
Conception du Droit International Privi d'apr.s la Doctrine et la Pratique
aux Etats-Unis, 21 Recueil Des Cours 193, 263 (Acadmie de Droit Inter-
national, 1928).
50. See O'Reilly v. New York & N. E. R. R., 16 R. I. 328, 17 Atl.
906 (1889). The cases cited by Hancock, op. cit. supra note 49 at 26, n. 2, do
not seem in point. Richardson v. N. Y. Central R. R., 98 Mass. 89 (1867)
stresses the "remedy"approach (infra note 53); and McCarthy v. Chicago
Rock Island & Pac. R. R., 18 Kan. 46 (1877) the extraterritoriality argu-,
ment as to a forum statute. For a modem case see Linn v. Phillips Oil Co.,
87 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Okla. 1949), where the Oklahoma federal court
refused to take jurisdiction in a suit for exemplary damages under a Texas
statute. While the reason stated was that the plaintiff had chosen the forum
"as a matter of convenience and not of necessity" (at 447), the penal charac-
ter of the foreign statute may have prompted the unusual decision.
51. See Woodard v. Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana R. R., 10
Ohio St. 122 (1859).
52. Minor, Conflict of Laws 492 (1901).
53. Richardson v. N. Y. Central R. R., 98 Mass. 85 (1867) ; Pickering
v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102 (1834) ; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119 (1871). But cf.
Ex Parte Van Riper, 20 Wend. 614 (N.Y. 1839).
54. See, e.g., Texas & P. R. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex, 375 4 S. W. 627
(1887), and in general Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Torts, 9 Tex. L. Rev.
21 (1930). The rule has steadily lost ground since Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918), has apparently been
abandoned in Texas [Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 193, n. 37 (2d ed. 1951)],
but seems to persist in Maryland. Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories,
155 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir. 1946); Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 183 AtI.
569 (1936). On the effect of Article 67, § 2 of the Maryland Code of 1939.
see Smith v. Bevins, 57 F. Supp. 760, 762 (Md. 1944).
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this preference they adhere to it by stressing their power to refuse
application of the place of wrong rule on grounds of public policy "
or forum interest in questions of "remedy."'  Nevertheless, foreign
claims, like foreign defenses, have found increasing recognition.5 '
Indeed, regarding new enterprise liabilities, even if fairness to de-
fendants acting under foreign laws seemed to argue against the
"extraterritorial" application of such liabilities created by the forum,
no such argument has existed against the application by the forum
of similar foreign liabilities which, far from violating the forum's
public policy, have often been found to meet a domestic trend.
But, if growing. concern for the plaintiff may thus to some extent
account for the recognition of "foreign-created" claims, similar con-
cern may have contributed to the further modification and refine-
ment of the place of wrong rule which expressed itself in the shift
within that rule from the place of acting to that of the harm, and in
the consequent elimination of foreign defenses obstructing the plain-
tiff's recovery. The development of this tendency in multistate tort
cases will now be discussed.
3. The Place of the "Last Event"
(a) Liability under the law of the place of harm (FHL and
XHL). Assume a law of the forum state F rendering liable air car-
riers for any injury negligently inflicted on their passengers and a
law of state X limiting such liability to certain amounts. Assume
further that plaintiff A, after having boarded a plane in X is injured
in a crash in F, caused by the pilot's negligence allegedly com-
mitted over X. Should A, in accordance with the classic rationale
of the place of wrong rule, be precluded from full recovery in F
merely because some (usually constructive) negligence is alleged
to have occurred in a state with a more lenient law, although the
defendant cannot claim with any justification that he would have
conducted himself differently had he expected application of the
stricter liability rule of the forum, and although the defendant's
55. Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 612 (1934). On the potentiali-
ties of this reasoning see Page. Conflict of Law Problems in Automobile
Accidents, [19431 Wis. L. Rev. 145, 153. For an illustration of the
present liberal attitude see Stoltz v. Burlington Transp. Co., 178 F. 2d 514
(10th Cir. 1949).
56. See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. 2d 597 (1936),
where Judge Lehman chose the unhappy formula [which if taken literally,
would deny all conflicts law] that the foreign "transitory cause of action"
would not be enforced if "contrary to the law of this state." See also Black
Diamond S. S. Co. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U. S. 386 (1949).
57. For an application of pre-Erie "general law" to that effect see
Northern Pac. R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 198 (1893); Dennick v.
R. R., 103 U. S. 11 (1880). For a new application of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause see Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609 (1951).
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enterprise may extend over several jurisdictions making it virtually
impossible to trace the causal harmful conduct to a particular phase
of its activities? "The ice began to form on the wings over Pennsyl-
vania; the wrong handle was pulled in the air over Mfaryland so
the de-icer broke down over West Virginia and the plane fell in
Virginia.""8 And where a resident of the forum state seeks to hold
a defendant entrepreneur under the law of the forum for harm in-
evitably caused by the defendant's hazardous profitable activity,
why, indeed, should the forum ever ignore its own interest in pro-
tecting the injured and itself against the former's impoverishment?
W\Thy should it permit a foreign defendant to invoke a more lenient
law which, while prevailing at the place of his activities, had not
determined his conduct, and even if it had, had not precluded him
from calculating and insuring against hazards created in the state
of the harm? In this sense the "place of harm" as that of the plain-
tiff's residence or business seems to require consideration. And in
this sense a place of harm rule could have been rationalized as to
those liabilities for "negligence without fault" the growth of which
may have decisively contributed to the adoption of such a rule in the
Restatement.59 Unfortunately, however, here again the Restaters
followed what they apparently considered a logical approach based
on historical precedent.
Dogmatic developments seemed to furnish the basis for the new
rule. The lex loci delicti had early become a conflicts rule comparable
and compared to, and often identified with, the ancient rule of the
lex contractus.60 And contract law was flatly applied where tort law
58. Knauth, Renvoi and other Conflicts Problems in Transportation
Law, 49 Col. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1949). See also Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Air-
ways, 95 F. Supp. 916 (Mass. 1951 ), where this argument defeated statutory
language.
59. Cf. Salonga, Conflict of Laws: A Critical Survey of Doctrines and
Practices and the Case for a Policy-Oriented Approach, 25 Phil. L. J. 527,
528 (1950). As to defamation see Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 947 (1947) ;
Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949), infra note
151. See also Hollinquest v. Kansas City Southern R. R., 88 F. Supp. 905
(W.D. La. 1950), where a railroad's liability to a Louisiana passenger was
adjudicated under Louisiana law though the accident had occurred in Mis-
souri. (Merely discussing the jurisdictional problem, the court seems to
follow the lex contractus.) See also infra note 87.
60. See 2 Neumeyer, Die Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung Des Inter-
nationalen Privat-Und Strafrechts Bis Bartolus 138 et seq. (1916), tracing
the doctrine into the Canon law of the 13th century. Early American cases
reflect this history of the lex loci delicti. See, e.g., Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb.
Pr. 316, 328 (N.Y. 1859), where the New York court, while refusing to
take jurisdiction in an action for false imprisonment by a California refugee
against an officer of the San Francisco Vigilance Committee, conceded that
the reason for recognizing the ubiquity of contract claims applied equally to
claims for injuries to personal property (debitum et contractus sunt nullius
loci).
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did not seem to produce the desired result. Thus, in Dyke v. Erie
RR. 1 the New York court refused to apply the statute limiting
recovery which prevailed in Pennsylvania, the place of wrong,
relying on the execution in New York of the contract of trans-
portation. In the law of Workmen's Compensation similar tech-
niques have resulted in the substitution for the original "tort
doctrine," of conflicts theories based on contract or residence or
both."*' In addition to the contract approach, revived reliance on
analogies with the criminal law63 seemed to permit the choice of
the place of harm at least in personal injury cases. Ultimately going
back to a decision by Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Davis-
and further to the English case of Re.x v. Combes0 one of the lead-
ing American cases relied on "that well established doctrine of
the criminal law that where the unlawful act is committed in one
jurisdiction or state and takes effect-produces the result which it
is the purpose of the law to prevent, or, if having ensued, punish
for-in another jurisdiction or state, the crime is deemed to have
been committed and is punished in that jurisdiction or state in which
the result is manifested, and not where the act was committed. ' ' G
61. Dyke v. Erie R. R., 45 N. Y. 113, 6 Am. Rep. 43 (1871). See also
Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, 266 N. Y. 244, 248, 194 N. E. 692,
,94 (1935).
62. Cf. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 281 et seq. (3d ed. 1949) ; Comment,
Conflict of Laws and the Indiana IVorkmen's Compensation Act, 24 Ind. L.
J. 232 (1949) ; Otjen, Conflict of Laws Questions in Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, 20 Miss. L. J. 162 (1949).
63. The chapter in the Conflicts Restatement on "Wrongs" (§ 377 et
scq.) is applicable to both torts and crimes (§ 425 et seq.).
64. United States v. Davis, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932 (C.C. Mass. 1837).
65. Rex. v. Combes, 1 Leach 388, 168 Eng. Rep. 296 (1785) (admiraltyjurisdiction determined by place of death without regard to place from which
shot fired). But see still King v. Alsop, 1 Show 339 (1691) (conviction re-
versed, the indictment failing to state where defedant stood when shooting) ;
and again Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63, 13 Cox C. C. 403 (1876)
("it is only for acts done when the person doing them is within the area
over which the authority of British law extends, that the subject of a foreign
state owes obedience," at 236, 541). See in general Stimson, Conflict of
Criminal Laws 46 et seq. (1936) ; Cook, Act, Intention and Motive i the
Crinminal Law. 26 Yale L. J. 645 (1917) ; Cibychowski, La Compitence des
Trihnnaux d Raison d'Infractions Commises hors dn Territoire, 12 Receil
Des Cours 251 (Acad6mie de Droit International, 1926) ; Foster, La Thorie
.lnitlaise dt Droit International Privi, 38 Recueil Des Cours 399, 535
(Acadtmie de Droit International 1938).
66. Alabama G. S. R. R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). See
also Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S. E. 984 (1893) (defendant indictable
in Georgia if his bullet shot from South Carolina struck in Georgia). But
see People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901) (jurisdiction of Cali-
fornia where poisoned candy mailed to Delaware victim) ; People v. Licen-
ziata, 199 App. Div. 106, 191 N. Y. Supp. 619 (1921) (jurisdiction of New
York, place of preparation of poisonous beverage) ; Beattie v. State, 73
Ark. 428, 84 S. W. 477 (1904) (Arkansas statute prohibiting the turning
loose of cattle inapplicable to such conduct committed in Missouri though
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Not until the rationalization under Beale's "vested rights" doc-
trine, however, did the place of harm rule find its present dogmatic
generalization referring to the place "where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place. '0 7 While
Story had considered the ubiquity of both delictual and contractual
claims as a matter of mere comity to be determined by the forum in
its discretion, such ubiquity now became a matter of logical con-
clusion, based on the omnipresence of rights "vested" outside the
state of the forum." It should not be necessary again to disprove
the validity of this theory which was so mercilessly and, we may
hope, definitively, defeated by AV. W. Cook in his classic book on
the Logicaf and Legal Bases cf the Conflict of Laws. 0 And Profes-
sor Rheinstein has, I believe, admirably succeeded in establishing
that Professor Beale, when formulating his last event rule, far
from correctly summarizing the weight of precedent, mainly relied
on cases following the discredited territoriality doctrine or pre-
cedents unrelated to choice o,. law problems.70 Nevertheless, how-
cattle straying in Arkansas, because act was "lawful" in state of acting) ;
Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 95 N. E. 2d 925 (Mass. 1950) (no jurisdiction of
Massachusetts court over offense af "begetting" committed in Rhode Island,
though child born in Massachusetts to Massachusetts resident).
67. Supra text at notes 4 et seq.
68. On the simultaneous appearance of the legal obligation doctrine in
Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, Godard v. Gray, (1870) L. R. 6
Q. B. 139, and Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 155, see Han-
cock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 8 et seq. (1942).
69. See supra note 5. See also Cheatham, American Theories of
Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1945) ;
Heilman, Judicial Method and Econoinic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43
Yale L. J. 1082 (1934) ; Battifol, Les Tendances Doctrinales Actuelles en
Droit Internatiomal Priv,, 72 Receuil Des Cours 5, 56 (Acad6mie de Droit
International, 1948). The downfall of the vested rights theory, the propaga-
tion of which by Professor Beale is now generally considered as a regrettable
error of a great scholar, can be demonstrated significantly by following
Judge Goodrich, another fervent adherent of that theory, through the three
editions of his text, in his "theoretical explanation" of the general recognition
of P's right under the law of Massachusetts to recover for harm inflicted
upon him by D in that state.
In the first edition we learned that "Massachusetts law is the only law
wbiich can properly determine the legal consequences of D's act," and "must
determine whether the harm done to P was to an interest entitled to protec-
tion." In the second edition Massachusetts law no longer "must," but "in all
fairness" "should" determine this question. In the third edition Massachusetts
law has ceased to be the "only law" which can do so. and the theoretical
explanation has become a "pragmatic" one based on nothing but the parties'
expectations. Unfortunately, however, the theory of vested rights with its
pseudo-logical approach, has, as will be seen. left all-too-many traces in the
formulation of conflicts rules in Judge Goodrich's leading text (supra note
6) as well as in the language, if not the holdings, of many courts.
70. Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Stud, in the Method of Case




ever questionable we may find the Restatement rule both as to
theory and authority, it has fully established itself in the law of enter-
prise liability, with regard to the recognition of place of harm lia-
bility under the laws of either (1) the forum or (2) a foreign
jurisdiction.
(1) (Where the forum is the place of harm, FHL.) The oldest
case generally cited in support of the place of harm rule, in which a
court held liable under its own law a defendant entrepreneur acting
under another law, is that of Cameron v. Vandergriff.7 1 Damages
were allowed in that case under Tennessee law for harm caused by
a blasting operation in Indian territory because the injury was
"done in this state." But this holding was based on a jury finding
of ordinary negligence which presumably would have supported the
same ruling under the law prevailing in the Indian territory. And
the place of acting was expressly referred to in Connecticut Valley
Lumber Co. z'. Maine Cent. R.R.72 prominently relied on by Beale
and others as authority for the last event rule. In that case, a New
Hampshire court, while for other reasons deciding for defendant
railroad, which had been sued under a strict liability statute of New
Hampshire for fire damage caused in that state by a spark emitted
by defendant engine in Canada, stated that "the locality of the act
is deemed at common law to be the same as that of the damage."
On the other hand, we find cases, even prior to the Restatement,
which, though not cited by Professor Beale, seem to support his
thesis better than those on which he relied. Thus, in El Paso &
A'. I'. RR. v. McComas 73 plaintiff, who had been injured in Texas
by a piece of lumber falling from a railroad car improperly loaded
in New Mexico by defendant's employee, was permitted to recover
fellow servant rule, because "the injury occurred in Texas, and, if
it was caused by the negligence alleged, the laws of this state, and
by a Texas court under Texas law, notwithstanding a New Mexico
not of New Mexico, would determine the liability ..... ,74 And
71. Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 13 S. W. 1092 (1890). For
cases relying on this decision, see Rheinstein, supra note 70, at 172, n. 58,
particularly Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S. E. 766 (1936), in-
volving the converse situation (Ohio law applicable to suit for damage to
Ohio storeroom from blasting in West Virginia).
72. Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. R., 78 N. H.
553, 103 Atl. 263 (1918), more fully discussed by Rheinstein, supra note 70,
at 167 et seq.
73. El Paso & N. W. R. R. v. McComas, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 81
S. W. 760 (1904).
74. Id. at 171, 81 S. W. at 761, quoting from the decision on prior
appeal. For the court's uncertainty the following dictum from Atlanta and
Charl6tte Air Line R. R. v. Tanner, 68 Ga. 384, 390 (1882) (not taking
a definite position in view of the similarity of the laws in question) seems
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whether or not Professor Beale was right, subsequent decisions
prove a tendency, at least since the adoption of the Restatement,
to prefer, in cases of enterprise liability, the forum's liability rule
as that of the place of injury aver the nonliability rule of the place
of conduct.75  Indeed, as explained above, where the forum.
in contrast to the place of confiuct, recognizes liability without fault,
application by the forum (as the place of harm) of that rule seems
eminently desirable.
(2) (Where the place of harm is outside the forum, XHL.) Nor
is there any objection to an extension of the place of harm rule
resulting in the converse application of a foreign liability without
fault in preference to a more lenient liability rule under the forum
law of place of conduct. True, little support for this proposition can
be gained from Otey v. Midland Valley RR.,7 1 the case relied upon by
Professor Beale, where the Kansas court holding defendant rail-
road liable for harm caused to plaintiff's barn in Oklahoma by the
emission of a spark in Kansas, refrained from deciding the conflicts
question, no difference between the laws of Kansas and Oklahoma
having been proved. However, since this case, and particularly since
the publication of the Conflicts Restatement, many cases have
applied the principle incorrectly deduced from the Otey case.7 7 One
of the most articulate recent decisions on this point is that of the
Second Circuit in Hunter v. Derby Foods where defendant food
distributing company was held liable for the death of an Ohio
resident caused by the consumption of canned meat prepared or
distributed by defendant. The trial court was upheld, having in-
significant: ". . . does the law of the place of the actual injury to the person
suing prevail, or the law of the place of the contract and of the prior negli-
gence, which was the real, or at feast the prominent reason of the injury?
We leave it undecided.. . ." (Italics added). See in general 2 Wharton, Con-
flict of Laws 1130 (3d ed. 1905).
75. Not all courts may be willing to follow this rule as one required
by logical necessity. See, e.g., Haw v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 180 F. 2d
18 (D.C. Cir. 1950), where the court accepted the parties' consent as to the
applicability of Virginia law to a Virginia accident because "the contacts
for choice of law purposes were overwhelmingly in Virginia" (Id. at 22),
rather than simply by virtue of the place of accident.
76. Otey v. Midland Valley R. R., 108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921).
Nor can such support be gained from the two cases Moore v. Powell, 29
App. D. C. 312, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1078 (1907) and Cameron v. Vandergriff,
supra note 71, relied on by the court in the Otey case. See Rheinstein. supra
note 70, at 166, 172.
77. One of the cases most widely cited for this proposition is Kristansen
v. Steinfeldt, 165 Misc. 575, 300 N. Y. S. 543 (Sup. Ct. 1937), rev'd 256
App. Div. 824, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 790 (1939) (no jurisdiction of state court
where conduct occurred in New York and "force impinged" in explosion
on high seas), relying on Kelly v. Steinfeldt, 98 N. Y. L. J. 1435 (Oct. 30.
1937) (not officially reported) and two admiralty cases. The Haxby, 95
Fed. 170 (E.D. Pa. 1899) and Smith v. Lampe, 64 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1933).
[Vol. 86:1
INTENTIONAL MULTISTATE TORTS
structed the jury that the violation of the Ohio criminal statute
against the distribution of spoiled food was negligence as a matter of
law. Ohio law was held applicable in accordance with Section 377
of the Restatement because the last event necessary to make the
actor liable (consumption, sickness, and death) had occurred in
Ohio; and because "the fact that the defendant's conduct occurred
in New York does not oust the law of Ohio.' '7 8 While the court
relied on cases hardly relevant to the present issue,79 its decision
clearly stands for the proposition that the plaintiff in a tort suit
against a manufacturer may invoke the law of the place of harm.so
From the standpoint of public policy there can be little quarrel
with this proposition. Why should a manufacturer or distributor of
mass products be permitted to invoke the law of the place of pro-
duction or distribution to defeat a stricter rule imposed, to protect its
citizens, by a state in which the defendant engaged in its hazardous
business, when presence or absence of such stricter liability could
in no way have influenced the defendant's conduct and although
the latter was in a position to foresee and calculate the existence of
such a liability when engaging in business in the state imposing it ?s'
To concede in cases of enterprise liability the interpretation of
the place of wrong rule as recognizing causes of action under the
law of a place other than that of acting, does not mean, however,
that the Restatement rule, either as a "last event" or "place of
78. Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F. 2d 970, 972 (2d Cir. 1940). See also
infra note 81. For another much discussed case see Fischl v. Chubb, 40
D. & C. Rep. (Pa. 1937), applying a New Jersey dog owners' liability statute
without regard to the forum law under which the dog had been kept; infra
note 104. Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 379, illustr. 4 (1934).
79. Keeler v. Fred T. Lay & Co., infra note 180; Moore v. Pywell,
supra note 76; Otey v. Midland R. R., supra note 76; Le Forest v. Tolman,
117 Mass. 109 (1875) ; Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine R. R., supra
note 72; Dallas v. Whitney, supra note 71; Scheer v. Rockne 'Motors Co.,
6 F. 2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934). See Rheinstein, supra note 70.
80. The decision in the Hunter case, supra note 78, was followed (or
anticipated) in Anderson v. Linton, 178 F. 2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Reed &
Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F. 2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1934) (coffee urn negli-
gently constructed in Mass., injury in Wis.) ; M [cGrath v. Helena Rubenstein,
Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822, 823 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) (cosmetics shipped from New
York to Pennsylvania) ; Openbrier v. General Mills, 340 Pa. 167, 16 A. 2d
379 (1940) (bread shipped from New York to Pennsylvania) ; 'Mannsz v.
Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (Illinois manufacturers' "negli-
gence" liability for defective rope breaking and injuring plaintiff in Penn-
sylvania) ; Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N. Y. 62, 80 N. E. 2d 334 (1948).
See also infra note 84.
81. Similar thoughts appear in certain cases dealing with the law ap-
plicable to the liability of the liability insurer. Courts seem to be inclined
to apply the law of the accident in preference to that of the contract which
was "broad enough to contemplate the risk" incurred in other states. Brad-
ford v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 179 Misc. 919, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 810
(Sup. Ct. 1943). See in general Faude, Conflict of Laws Applied to Autonio-
bile Insurance. [1950] Ins. L. J. 818.
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harm" rule is generally acceptable. It has been argued that the choice
of the last event rather than that of the first, or for that matter of
any other significant, event in the chain of causation, is arbitrary.-'
This and the even more persuasive argument that the last event
rule is circuitous in presupposing the choice of law it is designed to
ascertain may have caused courts and writers to refer to, and
apply, the last event rule as referring to the "place of harm,"13 or,
less frequently and less happily, as "the place where the operative
facts occurred. '8 4 Even if so rephrased, the Restatement rule can be
objected to on the ground that the exceptions recognized by the Re-
statement such as those regarding wrongful death and poisoning8
would warrant the re-examination of the principal rule. And further
studies of particular fact situations, such as those arising from
automobile or airplane accidents,86 may result in the adoption of
other tests.8 7 But whatever be the ultimate fate of foreign causes of
82. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 184 (2d ed. 1951) ; Harper, Policy
Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Loren-
-eu,'s Essays, 56 Yale L. J. 1155, 1162 (1947).
83. Supra notes 5, 6, 7. Judge Goodrich's deduction of this rule from the
consideration that "the plaintiff does not sue the defendant for the latter's
negligence, but because the negligence has caused the plaintiff harm," has
been retained even in the current edition of his textbook (op. cit. Vnpra note
6, at 263) notwithstanding Professor Cook's compelling refutation. Cook,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 317. The explanation of the place of harm rule as
"due to motives of convenience," advanced in the Restatement, Conflict of
Laws 97 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1930), though less legalistic, is even
less helpful. See Cook, loc. cit.. at 321.
84. This phrase seems to be preferred by Judge Goodrich's Third Cir-
cuit. See Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. 2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941) ;
Young v. Wilky Carrier Corp., 150 F. 2d 764, 765 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Mannsz
v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445, L49 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Moran v. Pittsburgh-
De Moines Steel Co., 166 F. 2d 908, 910 (3d Cir. 1948), followed in Diesbourg
v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 176 F. 2d 410 (3d Cir. 1949) (bottle shipped to
Florida from New Jersey) ; Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Pha., 190 F. 2d
825 (3d Cir. 1951) (wheel shipped to Oregon from Pennsylvania). This
phrase, too, is circuitous since it presupposes a law under which the facts
are "operative." Harm, on the other hand, can be objectively ascertained.
See also DeVito v. United Airlines, 95 F. Supp. 88, 97 (E.D. N.Y. 1951)
("significant facts").
85. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 391 (1934) (place of injury,
rather than death); Id. at § 377, Illustr. 2 (place of illness rather than
poisoning). See, e.g., Melton's Adm'r v. Southern R. R., 236 Ky. 629, 33
S. W. 2d 690 (1930) (injury in Virginia, death in Kentucky) ; Stumberg,
op. cit. supra note 82, at 192.
86. See Page, supra note 55, 99; Spence, Conflict of Laws in Auto-
mobile Negligence Cases, 27 Can. B. Rev. 661 (1949) ; Knauth, supra note 58.
87. Regarding a possible domicile test see supra note 59. Reluctance to
apply the place of wrong rule appears in many cases involving tort actions
by residents of community property states for causes of actions arising in
separate property states. Cf., e.g., Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co.. 52
La. App. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900) ; and in general Stumberg, op. cit. supra
note 82 at 208; Notes, 18 Tulane L. Rev. 319 (1943) ; 40 Col. L. Rev. 527
(1940) ; Page, supra note 55, at 164. with additional authorities; Morris,
The Proper Law of Torts, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
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action in the field of enterprise liability, it seems that the policies
determining the recognition of causes of action arising at places
other than that of acting, fail to justify the application of the same
tests to the recognition of foreign defenses in this field [infra (3)
(b), (4)] or even more conspicuously, the conflicts law governing
other torts so lucidly analyzed by Judge WVyzanski in the Gordon
case- [infra (5) 1. As will be shown presently, dogmatic generaliza-
ticns have in these respects created iniquities similar to those due
to similar generalizations regarding the place of wrong rule.
(b) Nonliability under the law of the place of harm (FHN and
XHN). As to the place of wrong rule, we have seen that American
courts, having acknowledged the unfairness of subjecting to liability
rules of the forum defendants claiming defenses under the law of
the place of conduct, have come to "recognize" such foreign defenses
(XN) : and that these courts, having dogmatically rationalized this
practice, have extended this "place of wrong" rule to include, with-
out support in its original rationale (fairness to the defendant), the
modern "tort" liabilities of mechanical enterprise for "negligence
without fault."
A very similar development in multistate tort cases can be
observed in the judicial development of the place of harm rule. We
may assume that the adoption of this rule was promoted by the
courts' reluctance to deny, under a foreign lex actus, recovery under
liability rules of the forum primarily serving the distribution of en-
terprise risk rather than the defendant's admonition (FHL and
XHL1. " ' But again' dogmatic rationalization has resulted in an
overextension of the rule which is now invoked not only to defeat
foreign defenses unjustifiable under the policy of the forum as the
place of harm (FHL), but also to allow such defenses, however
opposed to forum policy, merely because the harm occurred outside
the forum's jurisdiction (XHN).
We have seen that in the El Paso case, 90 the plaintiff, injured
in the state of the forum, was permitted under the place of harm
rule to recover against a railroad, though the causal negligence had
been committed in a state protecting the defendant under the fellow
servant rule (FHL). But does it follow that, on the same ground,
a plaintiff injured in a state so protecting the defendant, should be
88. Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (Mass. 1949), aff'd on other
'iromids, 178 F. 2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949).
89. This interpretation seems to be approved by Professors Yntema and
Rabel. See 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 302, n. 6 (1947). See also Cook,
op. cit. supra note 5. at 321.
90. El Paso & N. W. R. R. v. 'McComas, supra note 73.
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denied recovery although the causal negligence had been com-
mitted in the state of the forum in which that rule had been abolished
by statute? Many courts have so held91 (XHN). While occasional-
ly such holdings can perhaps be explained on more realistic
grounds,92 or within a rule of the place of conduct,93 the source
of this practice must be sought in the dogmatic approach of earlier
courts9" and later theorists.
Or to mention another frequent situation: It has been seen that
a good argument can be made for the application of the forum law
of unlimited liability to an injury sustained in an airplane crash in
the state of the forum even though the accident had been caused by
negligence committed in another .state limiting the carrier's liability
to certain amounts (FHL).95 But does it follow that a New York
court must apply a Connecticut limitation statute to the damage
claim of a New York passenger for harm caused by negligence
committed in New York merely because the subsequent crash
occurred in Connecticut (XEN) ?9 Only a fatally dogmatic ap-
proach can justify this result.
Promoting this approach even in cases of strict liability, the
Restatement suggests that water escaping from a reservoir main-
tained in the state of the forum whose law imposes strict liability,
91. The leading case is Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Carroll, 97
Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). See also on similar facts [negligent act in
Tennessee (liable), "killing" in Alabama (fellow servant rule)] in Nash-
ville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. R. v. Foster, 10 Lea 351, 361 (1882);
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 386 (1934).
92. See, e.g., Baruch v. Sapp, 178 F. 2d 382 (4th Cir. 1949) where the
federal court sitting in North Carolina denied recovery for death in an air-
plane crash in Kansas under the fellow servant rule of that state without
regard to the law of the forum which apparently was the place of the pilot's
causal intoxication. The court stressed the fact that the plaintiff's deceased
was aware of his fellow servant's physical state.
93. See Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109, 19 Am. Rep. 400 (1875),
infra note 104.
94. See Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R. R. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25, 31,
56 L. R. A. 468, 470 (1902), where the court, holding for defendant railroad
in a personal injury action by an Indiana resident on an Illinois accident,
applied the fellow servant rule of that state contrary to the forum statute
abolishing this defense. Insofar as purporting to apply to foreign injuries,
this statute was declared to be "an unconstitutional confiscation of property
rights" acquired under the foreign law. Needless to say that this approach
presupposes the vested rights theory now discarded by the majorities of
both courts and writers. Supra note 69.
95. See note 58 supra.
96. Faron v. Eastern Airlines, 193 Misc. 395, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 568 (Sup.
Ct. 1948) (the machine had caught fire over New York). See also Maynard
v. Eastern Air Lines, 178 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Smith v. Pa. Central




into state X which limits this liability to negligence, will not render
the owner liable for harm caused in X (XHN).5 7 If the Rylands v.
Fcl chcr doctrine here involved is designed to distribute risk created
by a hazardous enterprise, and if this liability can be fairly imposed
because the entrepreneur, rather than the party injured, must be
expected to calculate and insure against such risk,9 9 this conflicts
rule can hardly be said to follow the rationale of the liability rule.
And what may that guest of a Pennsylvania tourist have thought
of the place of harm rule, who, having been injured by a blowout
in Ohio, was told by the Pennsylvania court, in a suit against his
host presumably directed against his host's insurer, that since "to
constitute a tort, there must be injury," and since that injury oc-
curred in Ohio, and since Ohio had a guest statute requiring proof
of gross negligence, and since no such proof was offered, he could
not recover, although the defendant's negligent act had occurred
in the state of the forum whose law would have permitted recovery
(XHN) ?"
Thus, even in enterprise liability cases, where fairness to the
defendant carries little weight, adoption of the place of harm rule,
though properly eliminating domestic or foreign place of conduct
defenses in the plaintiff's interest (FHL, XHL), may prove inade-
quate if held to support defenses unknown to the forum (XHN), or,
for that matter, at the foreign place of conduct (FHN). It is sub-
mitted that both courts and writers have shown their uneasiness
regarding this problem by renewed attention to the law of the place
of acting.
4. A General Place of Conduct Rule? (FCL, XCL, FCN,
XCN)
Foreign courts and writers, when permitting reference to the
law of the place of harm, have frequently insisted on the plaintiff's
97. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 379, comment on Clause (c)(1934). Cf. the similar case of Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 (1875).
98. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (U. of
Calif. Press 1951).
99. Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 356, 185 Atl. 775, 777 (1936). See also
Pringle v. Gibson, 135 Me. 297, 301, 195 At. 695, 697 (1937). Page, Conflict
of Law Problems ip Automobile Accidents, [1943] Wis. L. Rev. 145, 154
criticizes courts for following "the basic theory of the horse and buggy
days," "without giving much thought to the matter," and suggests the
possible relevance of "the law of the place in which the automobile was
made and was equipped with accessories." Cf. Burkett v. Globe Indemnity
Co.. 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938) (Louisiana law applied to Alabama
accident, the causal negligence, namely defective repair of steering apparatus,
having occurred in Louisiana), overruled in McArthur v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
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right to choose between that law and that of the place of acting.100
Professor Lorenzen, referring to the German practice to that effect,
apparently advocates this choice for adoption by our courts."' And
Professor Cook has made similar suggestions."12 But domestic
authority for this proposition is apparently limited to a dictum in
one of the oldest cases in this field, widely relied on in later deci-
sions, where the Mississippi court, while applying a Tennessee
wrongful death statute to a death caused in Tennessee, assumed that
"physical force prqceeding from this state and inflicting injury in
another state might give rise to an action in either state, and vice
versa."
03
On the other hand, even in the field of enterprise liability, out-
side those liabilities, specifically to be discussed [infra (5)] con-
cerning which courts have consistently refused to follow the place
of harm rule, the place of conduct has not entirely lost its original
significance. Thus, in one of the very cases relied on by Professor
Beale for the last event, Le Forest v. Tohnan,04 the Massachusetts
court rationalized denial of recovery under a strict liability statute
of the forum, to a person injured in New Hampshire by defendant's
100. See generally 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 304, 333 (1947) ; Raape,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 366; Schnitzer, op. cit. supra note 19, at 597. For a
decision of the German Supreme Court to this effect, in addition to those
mentioned by Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws 370 (1947)
see South-African Steamship Co. v. Oldenburg-Portugiesische Dampfschiffs-
Reedei'ei, 138 R. G. 244, 246 (1932) (injury resulting on high seas on
German ship from collision caused by act performed on British ship-plain-
tiff's choice between English and German law). For a Swiss decision see
Bammert v. St. Gallen, BGE 40 1, 1, 18 (Feb. 27, 1914) (venue in criminal
fraud case), and a Spanish doctrine, 1 Orbaneja, Commentarios a ]a Ley de
Enjuiciamento Criminal 381 (1947) cited 2 W. Goldschmidt, Sistema y
Filosoffa del Derecho Internacioval Privado 77 (1949). A unique rule is
that of the Polish Supreme Court [9.7.1936, No. C. III, 1167/35, Off. Coll.
1937, No. 318, Journal Clunet, 627] choosing the law most favorable to the
defendant. Kuratowski, supra note 5, at 184.
101. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws 370 (1947).
102. Cook, op. cit. supra note 5, at 345; accord Kuratowski, supra note
5, at 189. See also Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59
Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1215 (1946) ; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 17 3(1933). But cf. Goodrich, Yielding Place to
New: Rest versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws. 50 Col. L. Rev. 881, 892
(1950), maintaining that Profes'or Cavers "has apparently retreated" in
Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1170, 1173 (1943).
103. Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans R. R. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977,
984 (1883) ; note 54 supra.
104. Le Forest v. Tolman. 117 Mass. 109 (1875). But cf. Fischl v.
Chubb, 30 D. & C. Pa. 40 (1937), where application of a New Jersey strict
liability statute to the bite in that state by a Pennsylvania dog was justified
by simple reference to the place of harm rule of the Restatement compelling
the enforcement of rights acquired in New Jersey. A more realistic inter-
pretation of these two cases would rely on the progressing understanding for
the liability of the dog owner as entrepreneur, primarily serving risk distri-
bution rather than admonition.
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dog owned and kept in Massachusetts, inter alia on the ground
that the defendant had "done no wrongful act in this Common-
wealth," it being "the act of the dog" committed in New Hampshire
for which the defendant would have been responsible. And we find
another significant statement in Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. R. 1'
where the Pennsylvania court explained application of its own
wrongful death statute to a New Jersey death caused by a Pennsyl-
vania accident, inter alia on the ground that "it is the tortious act
or negligence of the wrongdoer and not the consequences, that is
the basis or ground of action."1" While reference to the place of
acting in these cases are dicta significant merely as revealing a
persistent admonitory approach, the place of conduct rule has been
more widely preserved in broad fields of the conflicts law of con-
tracts and restitution. 0 7 And the exclusive reference in the Federal
Tort Claims Act to the "law of the place where the act or omission
occurred," even if an unintentional deviation from "the American
rule," as Judge Goodrich suggests,los at least reveals subconscious
resistance against the artificial "logic" of the Restaters. Finally,
as will be seen presently, the Conflicts Restatement itself, after
apodictically establishing the last event rule as the only logical one,
has reintroduced the place of conduct through the back doors of the
"privilege" and "standard of care" rules.
105. Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. R., 244 Pa. 255, 90 At. 558 (1914).
106. Id. at 262, 90 AtI. at 561. Although this language is often quoted
as exemplifying a place of conduct approach, the holding is in complete
accord with the prevailing rule since both act and injury occurred in Penn-
sylvania. See Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 82, at 185.
107. "The law of the place of performance determines whether a breach
has occurred." Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 370 (1934). See, e.g., Louis-
Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 43 F. 2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930). But the
law of the place "where the repudiation occurs" seems to govern anticipatory
breaches. Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F. 2d
823 (6th Cir. 1929). Cf. Wester v. Casein Co. of America, 206 N. Y. 506,
100 N. E. 488 (1912); caveat attached to Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§ 370 (1934). Claims for restitution should be governed by the law of the
place of enrichment. G. L. Williams, 7 Mod. L. Rev. 66, 69 (1944) ; Gut-
teridge and Lipstein, Conflicts of Law in Matters of Unjustifiable Enrich-
menit. 7 Camb. L. J. 80 (1930) ; Pontes de Miranda, La Conception du Droit
International Prv,5 d'aprs la Doctrine et la Pratique an Brasil, 39 Recueil
Des Cours, 553, 662 (Acad6mie de Droit International, 1932). No American
cases on this subject have been found. Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§452 (1934).
In Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932) plaintiff, owner
of an upper estate in Arkansas, sued defendant, owner of a lower estate in
Louisiana, in a court of that state for the removal of a dam obstructing
natural drainage. The court held for plaintiff under the law of Louisiana
because the act had been done in that state, and no greater hardship was
thus being imposed on the defendant "than if both estates were situated in
Louisiana."
108. Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest versus Motion in the
Conflict of Laws, 50 Col. L. Rev. 881, 895 (1950).
1951]
MIINNESOTA LAW REVIEV
Besides and beyond these instances, dissatisfaction with the
improper extension of the place of last event rule has caused renewed
advocacy for the place of conduct rule. Thus, Professor Rhein-
stein, having proved the Restatement rule to the unsupported by
the authorities, suggests in effect general applicability of the place
of conduct rule, with a right of the forum as the place of harm
to apply its own law if the alleged harm was reasonably foresee-
able by the actorY'9 And Dean Stimson in his "Bill Proposed for
Enactment by the Congress" prefers "the law to which the person
alleged to be under a duty was subject at the time of his conduct"
to "the law to which the person claiming the right was subject." '
Some support for these and similar suggestions by American
scholars may be derived from laws prevailing or proposed in other
countries. Only recently, no less a court than the English Court
of Appeals stated broadly that "the question is not where was the
damage suffered," but "where was the wrongful act, from which
the damage flows, in fact done?" '111 Several Romance countries
have codified this rule -12 and a Draft to a European Code of Con-
flicts Law would expressly exclude consideration of the law of
the place of harm,113 in confcrmity with the recent legislative ex-
periments of the Italian, Polish and Greek Codes. 14
109. Rheinstein, supra note 70, at 30. See also Rheinstein, Book Re-
view, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83, 94 (1942) ; 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 271 (1947).
110. Stimson, Simplifying the Conflict of Laws: A Bill Proposed for
Enactment by the Congress, 36 A. B. A. J. 1003, 1006 (1950).
111. George Munro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Cor-
poration, [1944] 1 K. B. 432, 441. In general see Dicey's Conflict of Laws
803 (6th ed. 1949). Bata v. Bata [1948] W. N. 366, often cited as establishing
the opposite rule, is not in point (place of wrong for purpose of jurisdiction
over libel suit is place of publication rather than of writing).
112. Raape, op. cit. supra note 5, at 365. See particularly the excellent
discussion on Brazilian law by Pontes de Miranda, La Conception dit Droit
International Priv d'aprs la Doctrine et la Pratique au Bresil, 39 Recueil
Des Cours 553, 662 (Academie de Droit International, 1932). For Spain
see also Sentencias 14-XI-1906, 11-V-1909, cited by Goldschmidt, op. cit.
supra note 100, at 77.
113. Frankenstein, Projet d'un Code Europ6en de Droit International
Priv6 (1950) Art. 532: "Un delit est commis au lieu ou son auteur a agi
reellement sans egard au lieu ou l'effet s'est produit."
114. See McCusker, The Italian Rules of Conflict of Laws, 25 Tulane
L. Rev. 70, 82 [Art. 25 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the Civil Code, as
interpreted by Monaco, Manuale di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico e Privato
610 (1949)]; De Nova, La Jurisprudence Italienne on Matidre de Conflicts
de Lois de 1939 a 1949, 39 Rev. Crit. de Droit Intern. Priv6 159, 341, 354
(1950) (referring to a decision of the Rome Trib. of Jan. 18. 1939, Dir.
Int. 1939, 305) ; Kuratowski, Terts in Private International Law, 1 Int.
L. Q. 172, 175 (1947) [Art. 11 of the Polish Private Interprovincial Law
of 1926; also Sulkowski, Conception du Droit International Priv d'apris la
Doctrine et la Pratique en Pologne, 41 Recueil Des Cours 607, 667 (Acad6mie
de Droit International, 1932)] ; supra note 23 (Greece). See also Arts. 167,
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It is submitted, however, that all these suggestions and pro-
posals are subject to the same fatal error which has rendered the
Restatement unworkable: they prove too much. They fail to recog-
nize the need for two different tort conflicts rules applicable ac-
cording to whether the policy of admonition or compensation pre-
vailingly characterizes the particular tort. Whatever the desirable
-'I,lhtion for many borderline fields, that much seems clear: A dis-
tinction must be drawn between those tort liabilities for hazardous
enterprise activities which, "wrongs" merely in name, tend toward
the recognition in their conflicts rule of an element more appropriate
t,, the growing policy of risk distribution than an (often unascer-
tainable) conduct; and those liabilities which, remaining prevail-
inly admonitory, should retain their relation to the law of the
place of the wrongful act." The impact of this distinction on the
choice of the proper conflicts rule can perhaps best be demonstrated
in the field of vicarious liability where the two policies continue
to co mpete.
The doctrine of respondeat superior has been one of the most
important tools of the growing liability of modern hazardous en-
terprise.,' If and where serving as such a tool, this doctrine
requires, therefore, a conflicts rule looking to a place other than
that of the defendant's conduct. In this sense Section 387 of the
Restatement is justified in referring to the "last event" in de-
termining the principal's liability (FHL and XHL).117 However,
to call "incorrect" a decision which stresses the place of the princi-
16 of the Codigo Bustamente; 3'Bustamente, Derecho Internacional Privado
451 (Habana 1931); Art. 38 of the Montevideo Convention (1889) and Art.
43 of the Treaty on International Civil Law of Montevideo (1940) between
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 37 Am. J. Int.
I.. (Supp. 1943) 95, 141, 147. On Bulgarian law see Daneff, Conception du
Droit Intrnational Przvt d'apr~s la Doctrine et la Pratique en Bulgarie, 33
Recueil Des Cours 487, 529 (Acadimie de Droit International 1930).
115. Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold and Reese, Cases and Materials on
Conflict of Laws 425 (3d ed. 1951). The distinction is clear in Schnitzer,
,op. cit. supra note 19, at 599.
116. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault 18 et seq. (U. of
Calif. Press 1951).
117. Decisions supporting the rule are scarce. Many cited for the
proposition [e.g., Cherwien v. Geiter, 244 App. Div. 814, 279 N. Y. S. 553(2d Dept. 1935) ; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 6, at 278] are not in point.
But cf. Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599 (1933) ; Kernan v.
Webb, 50 R. I. 394, 148 Atl. 186 (1929) ; Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight
Lines, 276 Mich. 545, 268 N. W. 887 (1936). For independent contractor
cases applying the place of harm rule see judge Goodrich in Venuto v.
Robinson, 118 F. 2d 879 (3d Cir. 1941); Muraszki v. William L. Clifford,
Inc.. 129 Conn. 123, 26 A. 2d 578 (1942) ; Kemp v. Creston Transfer Co.,
71) F. Supp. 521, 535 (Iowa 1947).
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pal's conduct over that of the harm," 8 means to ignore the rear-
guard action now fought by the policy of admonition in the law
of vicarious liability.
In Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 1"9 a Connecti-
cut automobile renting company was held liable under a Connecti-
cut strict liability statute although the accident had occurred in
Massachusetts, a state requiring proof of negligence. This decision,
while hardly supportable by the court's more than strained argu-
ment that the statute was applicable as a part of the contract, can
be fully explained as interpreting the forum statute as one de-
signed to promote careful selection by the renting company of its
customers. On this assumption, Connecticut will, of course, apply
her own law as that of the place of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct (FCL). A similar admonitory theory apparently underlies
Strogoff v. Motor Sales Co.,120 where the Massachusetts court
refused to apply Section 377' of the Restatement and the forum
doctrine of nuisance to harm caused in the state of the forum by
an automobile driven in that state, without the defendant's con-
sent, with license plates unlawful in its home state Connecticut,
because the "defendant did nothing in Connecticut to create a
liability there."
Equally indicative of a place of conduct approach is Schcer v.
Rockne Motors Corp. 2' where Judge Learned Hand held an
Ontario owners' liability statute inapplicable to an automobile
accident caused in that Province by an agent of defendant, a New
York corporation. In leaving open the question whether the statute
would have been applicable had defendant authorized the agent to
operate the car in Ontario, the court indicated its inclination to base
the principal's liability on his act of authorization. Whether the
118. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 6, at 280, with regard to Levy v.
Daniels' U'Drive Auto Renting Co., infra note 119. But cf. the excellent
analysis of that case by Stumberg. op. cit. supra note 82, at 205; and, as to
the principal's criminal liability under "the law of the state in which the
principal was at the time of the conduct," Stimson, op. cit. rupra note 65,
at 78.
119. Levy v. Daniels U'Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143
Atl. 163 (1928).
120. Strogoff v. Motor Sale3 Co., 302 Mass. 345, 18 N. E. 2d 1016
(1939).
121. Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F. 2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934). For
a significant reliance on this case in this sense, see Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F. 2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 741 (1951) where Chief
Judge Learned Hand found § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act violated
at the place of the wrongful transactions rather than at the seat of the
corporation, the obvious place of harm. Cf. Morris, The Proper Law of
Torts, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
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more recent case of Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O. V.122 can be
rationalized on a similar ground, is not clear. In that case, a Ne-
braska fraternal benefit society was sued by MNexican citizens for
a fraud allegedly committed by defendant's agent in Mexico. The
Nebraska court, though referring to the Restatement rule, based its
decision for defendant on the lex fori, Mexican law not having been
pleaded.r'2
Some support for the proposition that the. principal's liability
may be subject to the law of the place of his conduct may perhaps
be derived from the case of Steffens v. Continental Freight For-
warders Co.' - In that case an Ohio court reversed a judgment upon
directed verdict, which, applying Pennsylvania law, had denied
the liability of an Ohio interstate motor carrier, for an injury
caused in Pennsylvania by a truck owned and operated by de-
fendant's independent contractor. While approving "generally
speaking" the Restatement rule, which seemed to support the ap-
plicability of Pennsylvania law, the appellate court felt justified in
finding against the defendant whose liability was "affected" by the
Federal Motor Carrier Act requiring liability insurance for the
benefit of the public.1 2 This decision is not only highly significant
as basing tort liability on a provision requiring insurance-a topic
further explored by the writer elsewhere"--but by its apparent
preference for the law of the place of defendant's conduct over that
of the harm.22 7
Another somewhat unique case which, however, demonstrates
well the conflict of policies, is Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet
Co."- where the law of the forum Louisiana was. applied to the
liability of a Louisiana dealer for an accident in Mississippi caused
122. Molina v. Sovereign Camp. W. 0. W., 6 F. R. D. 385 (Neb.
1947).
123. Id. at 401.
124. Steffens v. Continental Freight Forwarders Co., 66 Ohio App. 534,
35 N. E. 2d 734 (1941).
125. 49 Stat. 557 (1935), 49 U. S. C. § 315 (1946) provides in part:
"No certificate or permit shall be issued to a motor carrier ... unless such
carrier complies with such reasonable rules and regulations as the Com-
mission shall prescribe governing the filing and approval of . . . policies of
insurance . . . conditioned to pay any final judgment recovered against
such motor carrier for bodily injuries . . . resulting from the negligent
operation . . . of motor vehicles under such certificate or permit. . .
126. Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 445 (1950) ; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 41 et
seq., 67 et seq. (U. of Calif. Press 1951).
127. Although the court purported to apply federal rather than either
Pennsylvania or Ohio law, it fully explored the law of Ohio which it found
to be identical with the federal rule. See also Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp.
488 (Va. 1943), subjecting an'interstate carrier's liability to state law.
128. Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co. (La. App.), 158 So. 223(1935), aff'd 182 La. 795, 162 So. 624 (1935).
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by a defect in a car manufactured in MAichigan and sold by him
in Louisiana. Since the Louisiana law limited the dealers' liability
to harm caused by defects known to them, the decision which is con-
trary to the last event rule can be rationalized as stressing the
admonitory policy of the law involved.
Nothwithstanding these and similar isolated cases revealing
a persisting admonitory approach even in fact situations increas-
ingly subjected to compensatory considerations, such considerations
have apparently decisively contributed to the general adoption of the
place of harm rule in the law of enterprise liability for negligence
without fault. On the other hand, the inadequacy of this rule in
cases involving primarily admonitory tort liabilities accounts, I
believe, for the frequent recognition in this field of defenses and
liabilities under the law of the place of conduct (FCN, XCN, FCL
and XCL). While further study will be required to examine the
scope of this development as tc each tort, it will be shown presently
that intentional torts at least have never been subject to the place
of harm rule of the Restatement; and that, therefore, judge Wyzan-
ski in Gordon v. Parker.29 was not compelled to resort to secondary
authority in support of the rule of the place of conduct (FCL) as
applied to the tort of alienation of affections.3 0
5. Place of Conduct versus Place of Last Event in the Conflicts
Law of Intentional Torts
The first Restatement "Illustration" to its place of harm rule
concerns a defendant who, standing in state X, fires a gun and
lodges a bullet in the body of B who is standing in state Y."' Y law
129. See note 2 supra.
130. In addition to the authoritiei discussed supra notes 10-13 and to
statements by various writers, Judge Wyzanski relies on two decision of
foreign courts: Lister v. McAnully (1944) 3 -D. L. R. 673 (Can. Sup. Ct.
1944) (applying the foreign domicile rule rather than the domestic place of
wrong rule to the scope of plaintiff's claim for loss of his injured wife's
consortium and services) ; and A. v. B., BGE 43 II, 309 (Swiss Supreme
Federal Court, 6.15.1917) (applying Swiss law to a suit by a Danish resi-
dent for adultery committed in Switzerland, because Swiss law was the
lex loci as well as the lex fori and the law of citizenship of both plaintiff
and defendant, at 317). More valid support could have been derived by the
court from Professor Beale's statement in his Commentaries on Conflict
of Laws, Restatement No. 2 (Feb. 27, 1926) 46: ". . . whether the husband
has a right of action against one who entices his wife from him ...de-
pends upon the law of the state where the wife ... is at the time."
131. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377, Illustr. (1) (1934). See
also, e.g., 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 182, n. 13 (1950 Supp.). The
only faintly similar tort case I have been able to find, is that of a German
frontier guard shooting and killing a French hunter beyond the border.
Frankenstein, op. cit. supra note 21, at 366. The Restaters, however, seem
to have drawn on Pauli Voetii, De Statutis Eorumque Concursu, Lect. I,
cap. I, 8, one of Story's principal sources.
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is said to apply because only Y as the place of the last event "has
legislative jurisdiction to determine the legal effect of . . . events
caused within its territory. 1 32 This dogma, as applied to intentional
torts, would not only, contrary to Mr. Justice Holmes' postulate
of justice in the Banana case, subject the defendant in a court of
state Y to that court's notions "rather than those of the place
where he did the acts"' 3 (FHL), but also deprive a plaintiff in a
court of state X of any cause of action accrued to him under its
own law (XHN), and, moreover, defeat the admonitory policy
of the forum. Both as to defenses and causes of action this rule
requires re-examination.
Discussions of the treatment to be accorded defenses under the
lex actus are still limited to the analysis of the fanciful Restatement
case of the shot across the border. While a similar tort case has
never arisen in an American court, this "illustration" has gained
some standing in dicta involving different facts. Thus, the case
of a sale in Ohio by a New York manufacturer of poisonous food
was said to be "like that of shooting a firearm across the state
line." 13 4 If it was this analogy that led the court to permit recovery
under Ohio law as that of the "last event" without regard to New
York law as the law of the place of acting(XHL), are we then
to assume that a ranger standing in the forum state F, shooting
at a well-known poacher practicing his profession in state X, will
be precluded under the same rule from claiming nonliability under
the law of his home state F-just because, in Restatement language,
the force of his gun "impinged" on the plaintiff's body in X ?'a5 It
was perhaps in order to avoid this result that the Restatement,
allegedly over the protest of Professor Beale, 1 31 has re-introduced
the place of conduct rule through the back door, or rather through the
two back doors, of the "privilege" and "standard of care" exceptions.
Under Section 382(2) of the Restatement "a person who acts
pursuant to a privilege conferred by the law of the place of acting
will not be held liable for the results of his acts in another state.' 37
Although completely unsupported by case law, either prior or
subsequent to the Restatement, 3s the rule is harmless enough
132. Restatement, Conflict of Laws 454 (1934).
133. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
134. Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F. 2d 970, 972 (2d Cir. 1940).
135. Restatement, Conflict of Laws 456 (1934).
136. See Rheinstein, supra note 70, at 10; 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 306
(1947).
137. Italics added.
138. The "Restatement in the Courts" (1945. Supp. 1948) cites the
following three cases in support: Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H. 82, 83, 174 Atl.
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provided no future court decides to interpret the term "privilege"
in conformity with the Hohfeldian terminology (elsewhere adopted
by the Restatement) 130 as entailing nonliability, and thus entirely
to reverse the last event rule even as to compensatory liabilities. If
properly limited to admonitory liabilities, however, and if based
on a privilege concept narrower than Hohfeld's, 14° the privilege
exception, though hardly useful, 4 ' is significant as illustrating the
need, stressed in the present paper, for the preservation of the con-
duct rule wherever, to quote M r. Justice Holmes again, it would be
unfair for a court to treat a tortfeasor "according to its notions
rather than those of the place where he did the acts.
14 '-'
A similar thought seems to underlie Section 380(2) of the Re-
statement, according to which the forum will follow the judicial
and statutory determination by the law of the place of conduct of
the required standard of care, without regard to the law of the
place of harm. Concededly unsupported by cases either prior or
subsequent to its formulation,4 3 this rule is illustrated in the Re-
508, 509 (1934) (no recovery in New Hampshire by wife against husband
on Maine accident in accordance with law of place of accident--choice be-
tween place of wrong and law of *orum rather between place of harm and
place of conduct) ; Benton v. Safe Deposit Bk., 255 N. Y. 260, 265, 174
N. E. 648, 649 (1931) (no question of "privilege," privilege provision not
cited) ; Ranton v. Pullman Co., 183 S. C. 495, 502, 191 S. E. 416, 419 (1937)
(no relation to question of privilege-choice between place of wrong and
forum) ; Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc., 145 F. 2d 804, 807
(6th Cir. 1944) (§ 382 incorrectly cited).
139. See Restatement, Properly §§ 1-4 (1936).
140. Cf. Goodrich, op. cit. u'pra. note 6, at 266; Restatement, Torts § 10
(1934) ; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 203, n. 77 (2d ed. 1951).
141. Since the distinction between "general" and other conduct (supra
note 140) is one resulting from the accidental phrasing of the liability rule
involved, the most helpful meaning that may be given to the privilege ex-
ception is probably one which, requiring some vague disapproval by the
law of the place of acting, would approach the "justification" rule of English
law. See note 17 supra. See also the excellent analysis by Stumberg, op. cit.
supra note 82, at 203.
142. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
143. "Authorities on this point seem not to exist." Commentaries on
Conflict of Laws Restatement No. 2, 55 (Feb. 28, 1926). But "it seems clear
in such a case that the law to be applied is that of the state where the alleged
wrongdoer acted: that law alone can properly qualify the action." Id. at 50.
The Restatement in the Courts (1945, Supp. 1948) merely cites cases in-
volving the forum's choice between its own law and that of the "place of
wrong." Tobin v. Penna. R. R, 69 App. D. C. 262, 263, 100 F. 2d 435, 436
(D.C. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. :. 640 (1939) (forum rather than place
of wrong law determines sufficiency of jury case) ; Strogoff v. Motor Sales
Co.. 302 Mass. 345, 18 N. E. 2d 1016 (1939) ; Peterson v. Boston & Maine
R. R., 310 Mass. 45, 48, 36 N. E. 2d 701, 702 (1941) (forum law as to
sufficiency of evidence) ; Pilgrim v. MacGibbon, 313 Mass. 290, 47 N. E. 2d
299, 300 (1943) (place of wrong law as to finding of gross negligence in




statement by the case of a railroad which, failing to use a spark
arrester required by the law of the state of the forum, will not be
held liable for a fire caused in that state (the place of harm) by
the emission, in consequence of such failure, of a spark in state X,
whose law does not establish such a requirement. Recognition of
railroad liability as one for negligence without fault 44 will cast
some doubt on the desirability of this result which is keyed to the
admonition of railroads rather than to the distribution of risks
created by their hazardous activities. Why should a railroad run-
ning its tracks in the vicinity of the state line and thus able to
calculate, and insure against, any harm it may cause by the emission
of sparks in the adjoining state, not in fairness be held liable under
the law of that state ?"4' Both this and the "privilege" exception from
the last event rule, though inappropriate in cases involving enter-
prise liability, show the Restaters' realization of the need for limit-
ing that rule, and could support the upholding, as to intentional
torts, of defenses raised under the place of conduct rule (XCN).
Being limited to such defenses, those exceptions are inadequate,
however, in that they fail to recognize causes of action based on
the law of the place of conduct (XCL, FCL), which courts have
never ceased to impose as to any one of the intentional torts now
to be discussed in detail.
(a) In this inquiry certain intentional torts will have to be
entirely or partly omitted. Assault'4 6 and malicious prosecution,
47
having found only passing attention, fail to furnish significant
material, though preference of the law of the place of conduct over
that of the place of harm seems imperative here. That this last
144. Professor Beale in the Commentaries, mipra note 143, at 55, ob-
jects to such a liability since "a law which held an actor under such circum-
stances would not be holding him because of his own negligence, but because
it set up an arbitrary rule of liability." That this "arbitrary rule" has been
recognized by the courts, this writer has attempted to show in Negligence
Without Fault (U. of Calif. Press 1951).
145. See note 76 supra.
146. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 411, Comment (b), Illustr.
4 (Proposed Final Draft No. 3) (1932) : "Two parties are at the opposite
ends of a railroad car. The assailant starts shaking his fist from the other
end of the car as he comes toward the assailed. The car passes the state
line so the assailed is in another state at the moment when he apprehends
immediate violence from the assailant, who remains in the first state. The
assailant has committed an assault in the state into which the assailed has
come." The Commentaries of the American Law Institute (1926) contain
no authority supporting this peculiar case. And Professor Beale fails to men-
tion assault in his treatise, Conflict of Laws (1935).
147. See Vancouver Book & Stationery Co. v. L. C. Smith & Corona
Typewriters, 138 F. 2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 786
(1944). Though invoking the Restatement, the case fails to present a choice
hictwcen the laws of the places of conduct and harm.
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rule is wholly inadequate as to intentional torts, is nowhere clearer
than in the much litigated law of multistate defamation, which, in
view of problems presented by multistate publication and distribu-
tion, has found little assistance in Rule 5 accompanying Section 377
of the Restatement referring to the place "where the defamatory
statement is communicated."' 14s This was dramatically demon-
strated in the much discussed Pennsylvania case of Harhann V.
Thne, IC.149 concerning a libel allegedly committed in LIFE. a
magazine first published in Illinois and distributed in other states
of the Union as well as abroad. Although the statutory conflicts
rule of Pennsylvania in connection with her "single publication
rule" would have required dismissal of the action under the Illinois
statute of limitations, the court allowed recovery under the law
of each state not adhering to the single publication rule. The circuity
and unwieldiness of this interpretation of the Pennsylvania con-
flicts rule has often been criticized ° A different approach
was employed in the case of Mattox v. News Syndicate Co." by the
New York court which, rejecting as "unmanageable" in multistate
tort cases the rule of the place of last event, applied the law of the
state of plaintiff's residence as that of the harm. That these decision,
lack any uniform foundation and fail to comply with the Restate-
ment is obvious. Yet it is not suggested that in such cases the solu-
tion can be found by a mere return to the place of conduct."*- De-
148. Though this rule may suffice in simple cases [cf. Campbell v.Willmark Service System, 123 F. 2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1941) (N.Y. law
applied to report sent to New York from Pennsylvania)], it is probably
contrary to such early cases as Stout v. Wood, 1 Blackford 70 (Ind. 1820)
[followed Offutt v. Earlywine, 4 Blackford 460 (Ind. 1838); Linville v.
Earlywine, 4 Blackford 469 (Ind. 1838)], where the Ohio non-liability rule
was applied to slanderous words "spoken" in Ohio, although these words
charged plaintiff with fornication in Indiana where she apparently lived.
149. Hartmann v. Time Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948) cert. denied
334 U. S. 838 (1948). For an interesting analogy in a case involving unfair
competition by broadcasting, see R.C.A. lfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d
86 (2d Cir. 1940) cert. denied 311 U. S. 712 (1940).
150. See Notes, 48 Col. L. Rev. 932 (1948); 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1460
(1948) ; 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 164 (1948) ; 43 Ill. L. Rev. 556 (1948). The
case was approved in Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp. 936 (D.C. 1951) be-
cause "it would be unfortunate if practical obstacles were to stand in the
way of applying a correct rule of law" (at 939).
151. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F. 2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1949)
followed in Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F. 2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951)(notwithstanding publication in Illinois, application of law of Indiana where
newspaper had "extensive circulation" and where plaintiff practiced his
profession). See also Caldwell v, Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 161 F. 2d
333 (5th Cir. 1947) cert. denied 332 U. S. 766 (1947) applying "principally"
the law of the plaintiff's residence. Cf. Notes, 24 So. Calif. L. Rev. lb3
(1950) ; 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1272 (1950).
152. Cf. Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947) (place of
newspaper publication); Spanel v. Pegler, 166 F. 2d 298 (2d Cir. 1948)
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famation and similar torts, such as impairment of privacy," if
committed by one of the ubiquitous processes of modern technique,
defy all traditional rules. Resembling enterprise liabilities without
fault more than other intentional torts, these torts, for the solution
of their conflict problems, must probably await legislative action.
154
For other reasons the tort of conversion fails to admit of a uni-
form solution. Since that tort requires "an act of interference with
the dominion or control over a chattel,"1 55 both wrongful conduct
and harn can quite regularly be localized at the situs of the chattel,
the law% of which has been applied, therefore, in several cases. 15 6 It
is perhaps for this reason that the only provision of the Restatement
dealing with conversion assumes identity between the places of
harm and conduct.1 , And it is apparently with this consideration
in mind that the Minnesota court in United States v. Rogers &
Rogers, classifying conversion generally as a "property tort" in con-
trast to a "personal tort," felt that the rights of the plaintiff must
always depend on the law of the situs of the chattel mortage.15 8 This
(same) ; Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930) ; Sheldon-Claire
Co. v. Judson Roberts Co., 88 F. Supp. 120, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) (place
of utterance). See also Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. 2d 227,
233 (3d Cir. 1941, on reh'g 1942), where the court, while assuming absence
of a conflict problem, interpreted the Restatement rule as referring to the
"place or places where the acts complained of occurred."
153. See, e.g., Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 354
(S.D. N.Y. 1939) where the court, declaring the conflicts question to be
"a bit involved," expressed itself in favor of the place where "the act"
occurred by which the "seal of privacy was first broken." In general and
for additional authorities see Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs.
Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 734, 759 (1948).
154. See Note, The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and In-
vasion of Privacy: An Unsolved Problem, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (1947) ;
Ludwig, supra note 153. See also Goodrich, J., in Campbell Soup Co. v.
Armour & Co., 175 F. 2d 795, 796 (3d Cir. 1949). The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws now have under consideration a Uniform Multi-State
Defamation Act. See Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Sept. 10-15,
1951 (Mim.).
155. Prosser, Torts 94 (1941).
156. See, e.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 262
N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933) (confiscation and sale of oil in Russia) ;
Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N. Y. 152, 156 N. E. 647 (1927) (Mexican
oil "there converted," at 156 N. E. 648).
157. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 415, Comment (b) (1934) ".'.. If
the carrier has delivered the goods to the wrong person, such misdelivery
constitutes a conversion . . .and the place of wrong is the place where the
goods were thus delivered." Cf. Morris, The Proper Law of Torts. 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 881, 886 (1951).
158. United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 36 F. Supp. 79 (Minn. 1941),
app. dism., 121 F. 2d 1019 (1941). Defendant, a 'Minnesota merchant, had,
in the course of his business, presumably in Minnesota, sold two head of
cattle subject to a Wisconsin chattel mortgage, which he had received for
sale from a Wisconsin resident. A suit by the United States as mortgagee
was dismissed with reference to the law of Wisconsin. See also Macon City




very case, however, illustrates one of at least two situations in which
multistate tort problems will typically arise: Intangibles may be
converted at a place other than that of chattels representing them,
and rights to possession, such as those of the bailor, conditional
purchaser or mortgagee, may be interfered with at a place other
than that of the situs. 55 While numerous cases and writers have
discussed the effectiveness of chattel mortgages outside the state
of recordation,'6" neither Professor Beale nor, for that matter, any
other writer on the subject, attempts to localize the tort of conver-
sion and the case authority is inconclusive. Since the law of con-
version "looks to the owner's loss, rather than the good intentions
of the defendant,"'' and is thus frequently classified as liability
without fault, the compensatory place of harm rule may, indeed, be
preferable. Yet not only the Restatement' 6 2 but several of the few
cases in point, while not always facing the multistate issue, use
place of conduct language. Thus, in Federman v. Verni"13 the
Federal New York court held against defendant mortgagee who,
on the strength of a chattel mortgage duly registered in New York
and thus valid against bona fide purchasers under the law of that
state, had removed the plaintiff-bona-fide-purchaser's truck from
Pennsylvania, where such purchasers were protected, because "ac-
cording to Pennsylvania law the defendant committed a wrong"
and "the law of the place of the wrongdoer's conduct determines
his liability."' 61 While the first statement merely illustrates the cir-
cuitous nature of the traditional approach, the second statement,
though hardly supported by the authorities relied upon,oi flatly states
the place of conduct rule. Similar language was used in Personal
Finance Co. of New York v. General Finance Co.166 where, how-
159. Prosser, Torts 99, n. 56, and 98, n. 45 (1941).
160. For a review of older cases see Metro-Plan v. Kotcher-Turner,
Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N. V. 334 (1941). For a recent significant case
see Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S. W. 2d 843 (1950), followed in
Clanton v. Thigpen, 226 S. W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Harris, 227 S. W. 2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
161. Prosser, Torts 104 (1941).
162. See note 157 supra.
163. Federman v. Verni, 42 F. Supp. 113 '(E.D. N.Y. 1941).
164. Id. at 114.
165. Slater v. Mexican National R. R., 194 U. S. 120 (1904) ; American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909) ; Spokane and Inland
Empire R. R. v. Whitley, 237 U. S. 487, 495 (1915) (places of conduct and
harm identical) ; Jarrett v. Wabash R. R., 57 F. 2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1932)
(same).
166. Personal Finance Co. of New York v. General Finance Co., 133
Pa. Super. 582, 3 A. 2d 174, 175 (1938), interpreting § 384 of the Restate-




ever, there was a coincidence of place of conduct and situs. Addi-
tional, though equally inconclusive, support for a place of conduct
rule may be found in the Plesch cases, involving the conversion of
securities, where the New York Court of Appeals, finding with the
court below under New York law in the plaintiff's favor "at least"
with regard to securities deposited in New York, the place of con-
duct, failed to deny a similar claim, based on the same New York
conduct, as to securities located abroad without inquiring into the
law of the situs.' 1 7 Finally, in Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co.'u a transfer in New York by a foreign corporation of land
situated in other states, which was illegal under the statutory law of
New York, though possibly legal under the lex rei sitae, was held
to entitle plaintiff to reconveyance or damages because "the law
of the place where acts occur normally fixes their jural character."' 169
This case, involving what can perhaps be qualified as a statutory
conversion of land, is on the borderline between conversion and
fraud and may serve as a transition to that field of tort conflicts law
where the place of harm rule has never gained even a semblance
of acceptance, either as to defenses or causes of action.
(b) Fraud. If liability in conversion cases looks to the loss rather
than to the defendant's intentions,'7 this can hardly be said of the
liability for fraud.'-' Nevertheless, we find the attempt to deal with
fraud as a "property tort,"' ' in the same manner as with collver-
sion, and to apply the law of the situs whenever a situs is ascer-
tainable. Indeed, at one time the Restaters thought they could find
in each fraud case an injury or loss relating to "land or chattels,"' 73
and the first illustration of the Restatement (inducement to part
with chattels) seems to lend itself to this treatment.
Easy of application as the situs rule seems to be, not a single case
supporting it has been found. Although in Geller v. Transamerica
Corp.'-7 4 a fraud claim based on representations which had induced
plaintiff to part with certain stock in a Kentucky corporation, was
held governed by Kentucky law because "the place of wrong is
167. Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la R6publique d'Haiti, 77 N. Y. S.
2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1948),
af'd, 298 N. Y. 573, 81 N. E. 2d 106 (1948).
168. Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 83 F. 2d 168 (2d Cir.
1936).
169. Id. at 171.
170. See note 161 supra.
171. See Prosser, Torts 701 et seq. (1941).
172. See note 158 supra.
173. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 411D (Proposed Final Draft No. 3,
1932).
174. Geller v. Transamerica Corporation. 53 F. Supp. 625 (Del. 1943).
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where the final act occurred" and "the offer was accepted and pay-
ment was made in Kentucky," that case is no exception since
both conduct and harm seem to have occurred in one state. More-
over, only in extremely rare cases will it be possible to identify an
alleged fraud with the loss of a particular piece of property.7 1
Recognizing this fact, the original draft of the Restatement speaks
generally of the location of the plaintiff's "property" and the pres-
ent language has even abandoned this test and speaks rather vaguely
of the place of loss. If the courts had ever paid more than lip service
to this rule they would have had to apply the law of the plaintiff's
residence or business wherever they were concerned with a loss
to the plaintiff's total estate.
Rule (4) of the "Summary of Rules," attached to Section 377
of the Restatement, states tha: "when a person sustains loss by fraud
the place of wrong is where the loss is sustained, not where the
fraudulent representations are made." As long as this "place of
loss" rule is invoked to defeat defenses under the law of the place
of defendant's conduct, it could perhaps be justified in certain situa-
tions favoring the plaintiff's right to choose.'-, However, purporting
to represent the only "logical" solution, the Restatement rule of
place of loss aspires to exclusiveness, overriding both defenses and
claims based on the lex actus. Its two "Illustrations" cover situa-
tions in which the plaintiff would be denied a recovery provided
by the law of the forum if the defendant can claim a defense under
the law of the place of loss, even if the state of the forum is that
of the wrongful conduct. Under these Illustrations a defendant
who, in state F (the forum) induces plaintiff in state X by false
representations to send him certain chattels, could not be held
for fraud in accordance with F law, if the law of X where plaintiff
"parted with the chattels" denies recovery. And a defendant who
fraudulently persuades plaintiff in state F not to sell certain shares
held in X, thus causing him to sustain a loss from a subsequent
drop in the market price, could defend himself under the law of X,
even if the law of the forum would allow recovery. But this is not
the law.
175. See the excellent analysis by Beach. Conflict of Laws in Multistate
Fraud and Deceit, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 767, 772, 774 (1950) ; also 2 Rabel, Con-
flict of Laws 326 (1947).
176. Text supra at notes 100 et seq. Criminal law cases are almost
exclusively concerned with questions of jurisdiction and depend largely on
the phrasing of statutes defining the completed crime. In most cases juris-
diction will be assumed, often by reference to the place of acting. See. c.q..
People v. Harden, 14 Cal. App. 2d 489, 58 P. 2d 675 (4th Dist. 1936) ; and
in general Note, 50 Harv. L. Rcv. 1119, 1170 (1937).
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Not a single case has been found in which the defendant escaped
liability by successfully invoking the law of the place of loss as
opposed to the law of the place of his act. And those cases presently
to be discussed, which purport, or are said, to recognize foreign
causes of action under the law of that place, can at least equally
well be rationalized under a place of conduct rule. The only case
seemingly constituting an exception involved a problem of jurisdic-
tion rather than choice of law. In Boule-vard Airport v. Consolidated
1 'ultee Aircraft Corp.,177 plaintiff had entered into an agreement
in Michigan with the defendant, a Delaware corporation with offices
in Michigan and authorized to do business in Pennsylvania, under
which plaintiff was to be the sole distributor in certain parts of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. From plaintiff's notification by de-
fendant without proper cause of the termination of this agreement
the Pennsylvania court inferred the perpetration of a fraud. Since
the court's statutory jurisdiction depended on whether defendant's
liability had been incurred within the Commonwealth, the court
had to localize the tort. Invoking the last event rule of Section 377
of the Conflicts Restatement and Section 889, comment c, of the
Torts Restatement, according to which this tort is complete "when
the other person acts thereon to his detriment," the court found
that "since most of the plaintiff's territory was in Pennsylvania
it is logical [sic] to conclude that the plaintiff acted in Pennsyl-
vania." 1 s5 It was apparently mainly this case on which the author
in a recent analysis of the conflicts law of fraud bases his sugges-
tion that fraud claims should be governed by the law of "the place
where the plaintiff first acts in reliance on the defendant's misrepre-
sentations .''7' But, being concerned with the interpretation of a
jurisdictional statute and not involving a conflict between the laws
of loss and conduct, this case, while significant for the difficulty pre-
sented by the plain place of loss formula, cannot be considered
as authority for either proposition.
Equally inconclusive is the only authority relied on by Professor
177. Boulevard Airport, Inc. v. Consol. Vultee Aircraft Corp., 85 F.
Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
178. Id. at 880. See also Iasigi v. Brown, 17 How. 183, 194, 58 U. S.
182, 193 (1854), reversing dismissal under a Massachusetts statute by the
Massachusetts District Court, of a suit for false representations made in
writing in New York because "the letter was intended to operate in Massa-
chusetts."
179. Beach, supra note 175, at 776. Neither of the two other cases re-
licd on (id. at 778) are of any assistance: Smyth Sales, Inc. v. Petr. Heat &
Power Co., ifra note 188; Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, iznfra note
196.
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Beale for the place of loss rule. In Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co.""°
defendant had induced the plaintiff to sell land situated in New
York, and the Massachusetts court, deciding for plaintiff, held
New York law applicable, although "false representations were
made in another state," the theory being in Professor Beale's
opinion that the transfer of the property constituted "the injury
to the plaintiff's estate which the action for fraud is intended to
redress."' 81 What the court said in fact was that it "had no occa-
sion to determine whether the law of Massachusetts (the pre-
sumable place of the representations) is in any way different," thus
possibly implying the exact opposite of Professor Beale's rule,
namely that, if Massachusetts laws had been ascertained to be
different, the court might have had to apply that law as that of the
place of that conduct which, we might add in paraphrasing Pro-
fessor Beale, the action for fraud is intended to amerce.
Nor is Professor Beale's thesis supported by the cases cited in
the Keeler case. Huntington v. Attrill,1 2 though stressing the
identity of the two laws in question, refrains from deciding the con-
flicts points apparently raised 1y the defendant. If supporting any test,
this decision (again in plaintiff's favor) supports a place of con-
duct rule since the law of that state (New York) was applied in
which the defendant had sworn a false oath and the place of loss
if anywhere was in Canada or Maryland. And in James Dickinson
Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry,'8 '3 Justice Brandeis upheld recovery
in an Illinois court under a Texas fraud statute, where plaintiff had
been induced by acts committed in Texas to purchase land in that
state, although the loss, if anywhere, had been sustained in Illinois
since the land purchased was neither "injured" nor "lost" in the
transaction. That the location of the property will be given little
weight as the place of loss is suggested by the very similar case of
Israel v. Alexander,8  where the New York court applied the
Illinois fraud rule against defendant, because "the defendant's
allegedly fraudulent representations [concerning purchase of an
interest in a Louisiana oil well] were made in Illinois; it was there
180. Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 49 F. 2d 872 (1st Cir. 1931), second
appeal, 65 F. 2d 499 (1st Cir. 1933).
181. Beale, Conflict of Laws 1287 (1935).
182. Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
183. James-Dickinson Farm Mfortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119
(1926).
184. Israel v. Alexander, 50 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
See also United States Nat. Bank of Denver v. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317, 210
P. 2d 600 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 995 (1950), 224 P. 2d 658 (1950),
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 957 (1951).
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that the agreement was made." Since the court also stressed that
Illinois was the place where "plaintiff parted with his money" the
case is not unambiguous support for a place of conduct rule, but
it certainly fails to apply the law of the place of the situs or loss. Nor
was that rule applied in the similar case of Browin v. Ohman,1s'
where the Mississippi court decided for plaintiff in a fraud suit
refusing to adopt the reasoning of the dissenting minority, according
to which Tennessee law applied as the lav of the state in which
plaintiff relied on misrepresentations made partly in Mississippi.8 6
Not furnishing any authority as to the conflicts rule in fraud
cases, the Keeler case, so prominently relied on by Professor Beale,
has not been cited in a single case involving fraud. 1 7 But the ques-
tion was expressly discussed again in a recent case decided by
judge Goodrich. In Smyth Sales v. Petr. Heat and Power Co."""
plaintiff's predecessor, operating in New Jersey, sued in the New
Jersey court in fraud for a loss occasioned by the sale of its business
to defendant in Connecticut for an inadequate consideration ac-
cepted because of certain misrepresentations of fact. Relying on
Section 377 of the Restatement, Professor Beale's treatise, and
three cases at least permitting, if not compelling, inferences to the
contrary,"' for the rule that "in actions for fraud and deceit, the
place of wrong is the place where the loss is sustained,"'19 the
court, reversing the dismissal of the suit, held the law of Connecticut
applicable because "the event which occasioned these losses was the
execution of the contract in Connecticut." If anywhere one should
assume the loss occurred at the place of the plaintiff's business.
This test was in fact applied quite openly to the plaintiff's claim
for damages for malicious interference with his business as to which
New Jersey law was declared applicable, both as to the foundation
of the claim and exemplary damages' 9 ' because, "whatever the acts
are which are supposed to support this claim, they occurred in New
185. Brown v. Ohman, 43 So. 2d 727 (1949) aff'd on suggestion of error
from 42 So. 2d 209 (Miss. 1949), cited with approval in Dodson v. McElreath,
210 Miss. 160, 167, 48 So. 2d 861, 865 (1950) (dictum).
186. Id. at 43 So. 2d 733, deciding the case under both Mississippi and
Tennessee law, declared to be identical. But cf. dissent id. at 747.
187. The case was cited in Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F. 2d 970 (2d
Cir. 1940) ; A. B. v. C. D., infra note 200; and in The Medric, [1945] Am.
Mar. Cas. 159, 160 (Ct. Cls. 1945) (no conflicts problem).
188. Smyth Sales v. Petr. Heat & Power Co., 128 F. 2d 697 (3d Cir.
1942), on second appeal on other grounds 141 F. 2d 41 (3d Cir. 1944).
189. A. B. v. C. D., infra note 200; Bradbury v. Central Vermont
R. R., infra note 193; Commonvealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, infra note 196.
190. Smyth Sales v. Petr. Heat & Power Co., supra note 188, at 699.
191. Smyth Sales v. Petr. Heat & Power Co., supra note 188, at 702,
with further references to judge Goodrich's text.
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Jersey.' 1 92 If the Smyth case itself fails to support the place of loss
rule, this is equally true for the following cases relied on by the
court.
In Bradbury v. Central Vermont RR.1"  the suit was based on
the false representations made in Vermont by defendant's agent,
that the plaintiff could according to the law of Canada send Christ-
mas trees to that country. The Massachusetts court upheld the ver-
dict for the plaintiff based on the ruling that "the rights of the par-
ties must be determined in accordance with the law of Vermont,
where the. cause of action arose. ' 194 Nothwithstanding the citation
of Section 377 of the Restatement, both the holding and the cases
relied on by the court19 ' can be reconciled with the rule that the
place of conduct governs rather than that of any harm. For if the
place of loss in this case can be identified at all, it was Vindsor,
Ontario, where the Christmas trees had to be destroyed as having
been imported contrary to Canadian regulations.
The second case relied on by Judge Goodrich in the Smyth case
is that of Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. 3IcAeil.'90 Plaintiff, a Penn-
sylvania corporation, had been induced by defendant's representa-
tions in New York to enter into a certain contract with a New
York corporation and to abandon a valuable contract then in force
with a Connecticut corporation. The Pennsylvania court, holding
for the plaintiff, declared applicable the law of New York as that
of the locus delicti since "both the Connecticut company and the
New York company contracts were made in New York and the
fraudulent representations, found proven, were also made in New
York."' 9 7 A later similar case is equally inconclusive. In Phillips v.
Belding Hemingway Co.198 plaintiff, presumably a New York cor-
poration, charged defendant, a Connecticut corporation, for having
induced Southern Mills, a North Carolina corporation, to breach
its contract with plaintiff by concluding another contract with
Southern in North Carolina. Though stating that the decision for
192. Ibid.
193. Bradbury v. Central Vermont R. R., 299 Mass. 230, 12 N. E. 2d
732 (1938).
194. Id. at 233, 12 N. E. 2d at 734.
195. Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N. E. 477 (1919) ; Gannett v.
Boston & M. R. R., 238 Mass. 125, 130 N. E. 183 (1921) ; Walker v. Lloyd,
295 Mass. 507, 4 N. E. 2d 306 (1936) (automobile and railroad accidents,
conduct and injury occurring at sMme place).
196. Commonvealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 At. 794
(1925).
197. Id. at 404, 130 AtI. at 800.




defendant would have been the same whether New York or North
Carolina law applied, the New York court purported to follow
Sections 377 and 378 of the Restatement and the Hunter case' 99
by referring to the place of the second contract as that of the "last
event." Whether or not that place or New York as the situs of
plaintiff's harm should be considered as the place of the last event,
a conduct rule would have supported the same result.
Finally, the court in the Sinyth case cited the case of A. B. v.
C. D.2' ' where the Pennsylvania court dismissed a suit for breach
of a promise made by defendant, a New York resident, to marry
plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, inter alia because, even if the
wrongful conduct had occurred elsewhere, the "loss was sustained
in either Pennsylvania or New York" where relief was barred, and
"the law where the loss was sustained determines whether there was
actionable fraud." Relying on Section 377(4) of the Restatement
and the Keeler case,20 1 the court also stressed that the wrongful con-
duct, too, had occurred in either one of these states.
To complete the picture one might add that neither of the two
cases which in turn have cited the Smyth case as authority, supports
the proposition for which it is said to stand. In Moran v. Pitts-
burgh-De Moines Steel Co.2 0 2 Ohio law was applied to a wrongful
death action arising from the explosion of a tank because "the
tank was built and the catastrophe occurred" in that state.20 3 And
Cowley v. Anderson20 involved a damage suit for breach of contract.
We may conclude that none of the fraud conflicts cases so far
decided compels the assumption that the courts will apply a law of
"last event," harm, or "loss" different from that of the place of
conduct, either as to defenses or causes of action and that the
courts' reasoning in many cases indicates a clear preference for
the law of the place of acting as the law the defendant was ex-
pected to obey.
(c) Unfair competition. Closely related to the law of fraud is
that of unfair competition. But judge Goodrich only recently ex-
199. Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F. 2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
200. A. B. v. C. D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd, 123 F. 2d
1017 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 691 (1941). See in general
Weidenbaum, Breach of Promise in Private International Law, 14 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 451 (1937) ; Duevel, Das Verloebnis im Deutschen Internation-
alen Privatracht (1939).
201. Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co., supra note 180.
202. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 86 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.
Pa. 1949).
203. Id. at 262. Italics added.
204. Cowley v. Anderson, 159 F. 2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1947).
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pressed his apprehension that in this field, as in the field of multi-
state defamation, the conflict of laws rule might "depart from the
general rule of reference to the place of wrong, because of the com-
plications involved in such reference in a multistate tort.120 5 Indeed,
if the place of wrong, contrary to authority and in keeping with
the teachings of Goodrich and the Restatement, is generally identi-
fied with the place of the last event, rather than with that of the
wrongful conduct, the place of wrong rule must fail. But courts
have, as far as I can see, never followed this theory except in order
to couch in acceptable language their preference for their own law"-0o
which, regularly, is identical with the law of the place of defendant's
main place of business and thus of the center of his wrongful con-
duct. Maybe, then, it is not quite so "strange" that the only case
which has applied the laws of more than one state referred to the
"place of act" rather than to the "place of impact. ' 20 7
The fascination of the last event rule, however, is so strong
that Callman's leading text on unfair competition repeats it without
critical examination, though correctly reporting judicial references
to the place of conduct.208 Beginning with the leading Vacuum Oil
case,2 ° 9 the authorities relied on fail to support this approach. In
that case an injunction by the New Jersey Federal Court was held
205. Campbell Soup v. Armour & Co., 175 F. 2d 795, 796 (3d Cir. 1949).
See also Adam Hat Stores v. Lefco, 134 F. 2d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 1943), where
Judge Goodrich's court, lacking a state rule, applied a conflicts rule of
"general law." For an excellent analysis resulting in the application of
federal law see Judge Wyzanski in National Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinell-
Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F. 2d 618 (1st Cir.
1944). See also Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 42 Col. L. Rev. 955, 964 (1942).
206. See, e.g., Cridlebaugh v. Rudolph, 131 F. 2d 795 (3d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U. S. 779 (1943) ; Margarete Steiff, Inc. v. Bing, 215 Fed.
204 (D.C. Cir. 1914). The writer of the Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1320
(1947) reports that "among all decisions studied, only two have not ex-
clusively applied forum law, or, in the case of federal courts, the law of the
state in which the court was sitting," citing Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. 2d
979 (4th Cir. 1944) (federal law applied to equitable remedy) ; Zephyr
American Corp. v. Bates Mfg. Co.. 59 F. Supp. 573 (N.J. 1945) (infra note
225). Neither case supports the place of last event rule. Forum law as such
seems to have been applied in Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. Cook Chemical
Co., 85 F. Supp. 257 (W.D. Mo. 1949) ; Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labora-
tories, Inc., 155 F. 2d 59, 67 (4th Cir. 1946) ; Saperstein v. Grund, 85 F.
Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Iowa, 1949). See also Neuhoff, Inc. v. Neuhoff Packing
Co., 167 F. 2d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 1948).
207. Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1319, n. 38 (1947). See in general
the excellent note by Schopflocher, Conflict of Laws, with respect to Trade-
mark Infringement or Unfair Competition, etc., 148 A. L. R. 139 (1944).
208. 2 Callman, Unfair Competition and Trademarks 1750 (1945). But
cf. id. at 1754 ("acts"), 1757 ("open question").
209. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. of N. Y., 154 Fed. 867 (N.J.




properly decreed under American law, even though it concerned
a fraudulent scheme involving the purchase and shipment from this
country of oil for sale abroad in unfair competition with the com-
plainant, an American corporation. While the court could have
easily based this ruling on the place of harm clearly situated in this
country, it stressed, somewhat laboriously, the fact that the law at
the foreign place of conduct was presumed to be the same as in this
country and that, anyway, part of the acts had been committed in
this country.210
All other cases referred to by Callman as supporting the last
event rule, either may or must be rationalized under a rule apply-
ing the law of the place of conduct. In Rehbein v. Weaver-21 the
Illinois court, while holding for defendant on other grounds, con-
ceded the possibility of recovery under a Missouri infringement
statute for "acts" committed in that state. In Coty v. Prestonettes21 2
a general injunction was granted under the common law, the court
pointing out that a pertinent New York statute would have had
to be restricted to "acts done by the defendant within the state of
New York"; and the decision in Hecker-H. 0. Co. v. Holland Food
Corp.,2 13 enjoining defendants from labeling in this country their
goods with colorable imitations of the plaintiff's brand, was appar-
ently distinguished in George [V. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co.2 1 4
with reference to the law of the country where the acts "are to be
consummated." A similar distinction under the Sherman Act was
drawn as to the American Banana case21 5 in United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp.'216 And in Norris v. Altstaedter21  a place of conduct
rule was clearly assumed. Defendant, a New York resident, was en-
joined by the New York court from continuing unfair competition
by "fraudulent acts" in Canada of imitations of plaintiff's merchan-
dise, under the law of Ontario presumed to be the same as that of
the forum, in reliance on the similar presumption in the Vacuum
Oil case. -1
210. Id. at 875. See on the same facts Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co.,
122 Fed. 105 (C.C. N.J. 1903), declining jurisdiction because "an act legal
in the country where performed" cannot be punished elsewhere (at 106).
211. Rehbein v. Weaver, 133 Fed. 607 (N.D. Il. 1904).
212. Coty v. Prestonettes, 285 Fed. 501, 516 (2d Cir. 1922), rev'd on
other grounds, 264 U. S. 359 (1924).
213. Hecker-H. 0. Co. v. Holland Food Corp., 36 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir.
1929).
214. George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F. 2d 536, 540
(2d Cir. 1944).
215. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
216. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U. S. 268, 275 (1927).
217. Morris v. Altstaedter, 93 Misc. 329, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1103, 1105
(Sup. Ct. 1916).
218. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., supra note 210.
1951]
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That no fundamental change has occurred since most of these
cases were decided appears from an analysis of a series of recent
lower court decisions all of which, though not always very articu-
lately, apply the law of the place of conduct in preference to what-
ever law could be considered as the law of the place of the "last
event" rendering the defendant liable. In Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co.2 19 Massachusetts (forum)
law was applied "in view of the fact that defendants prepared all
their material in Massachusetts and the further fact that the greater
part of the competition between defendants and plaintiffs occurred
in Massachusetts.12 2 0 In Safeway Stores, Inc v. Sklar,-2 1 Pennsyl-
vania (forum) law was held to support plaintiff's claim as the law
of "the place of the alleged wrong," because "all the acts of the
defendant ... have taken place within the boundaries of the Com-
monwealth, "222 though plaintiff was a Maryland corporation and
received protection "in a territory in which it [had] only potential
customers" 22 thus clearly not suffering any loss in that territory.
Similarly, a Michigan corporation was allowed to recover in Penn-
sylvania under the law of that state because "the specific acts of
defendants complained of occurred in this district.
-2 2 4
The same trend appears in decisions of federal circuit courts.
In Zephyr American Corporation v. Bates Mfg. Co.2 2 5 plain-
tiff, among other things charged unfair competition committed in
New Jersey by the mailing in that state of infringement notices.
The court, referring to the conflicts rule of New Jersey that the
right to recover for an alleged tort is "governed by the law of the
219. Triangle Publications Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co.,
46 F. Supp. 198 (Mass. 1942). See also Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair,
Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445, 448 (Mass. 1948), where the same Judge (AVyzanski)
held for plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, under the law of Massachusetts,
inter alia because "defendant's action in establishing a store occurred in
Massachusetts and, so far as the evidence discloses, had no effect outside of
Massachusetts." Whether such an effect would have altered the decision
does not appear. Judge Wyzanski's general philosophy on the subject is fully
set forth in National Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F.
Supp. 499, 504 (Mass. 1942). See note 205 supra.
220. Triangle Publications Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co.,
46 F. Supp. 198, 203 (Mass. 1942).
221. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Sklar, 75 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
222. Id. at 102.
223. Id. at 105.
224. Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190, 198 (M.D. Pa.
1948). See also Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622, 627 (W.D.
Pa. 1948).




particular State where the torts were committed,"226 held New
Jersey law applicable in this regard, without examining the ques-
tion in which state the loss was sustained. A similar approach was
taken in Adam Hat Stores v. Lefco, 2 7 where the place of wrong was
found at the place where defendants had opened their store; and in
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Belt &
.Mtfg. Co. 22 8 which involved a claim of misappropriating a novel
system of mechanically addressing business forms by the sale by
defendant of blank plates to be used in conjunction with the plain-
tiff's machines. In the last case, the Illinois court, rejecting the lower
court's application of federal law as well as the plaintiff's argument
that "no wrong was committed until the plates were actually used
in a foreign state," applied the law of Illinois as that of the state
of the place of the "manufacture and sale by the defendant of plates"
as "the essential element of this alleged wrong."
True, the place of conduct rule in unfair competition cases is
probably based on reasons of expediency 20 rather than the promo-
tion of an admonitory policy. 230 But, whether or not it should be
226. Id. at 386. See also judge Goodrich in Browning King Co. of New
York v. Browning King Co., 176 F. 2d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1949).
227. Adam Hat Stores v. Lefco, 134 F. 2d 101 (3d Cir. 1943).
228. Addressograph-AMultigraph v. American Expansion Belt & Mfg.
Co., 124 F. 2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 682 (1942).
229. Similar considerations seem to underlie similar trends in other
countries. See, e.g., the decision of the Supreme Federal Court of Switzer-
land in Wille v. Bachschmid, BGE 22, 1164, 1170 (Nov. 6, 1896), where
Swiss law was held applicable to a suit for unfair competition committed by
publications in India because the tort was alleged to have been "committed
from Swiss territory."
Of particular interest in this regard is the development of the practice of
the German Supreme Court. As early as 1903 (RGZ 55, 199) we find a rule
subjecting all foreign acts to German law if affecting German nationals,
and rationalized on a "place of harm" theory. In 1933 (RGZ 140, 25) the
Court returned to a place of conduct rule, which it interpreted on November
15, 1935 (J.,. 1936, 923) as covering the preparation in Germany of
pamphlets which were to, and did, become effective abroad. (See also RGZ
150, 265, of 2.14.1936). However, progressing nationalism prompted a writer
in 1936 to demand liability of all Germans for their acts committed abroad,
since German nationals anywhere owed National Socialist "faith" to their
competitors. See Lorenz, 7 Giurisprudenza Comparata Di Diritto Inter-
nazionale Privato 85, 88 (Instituto Italiano di Studi Legislativi, Rome 1941).
See also Eckstein, id. at 90.
230. But cf. to this effect Raape, op. cit. rupra note 5, at 365: "The
German firm which competes with an Italian firm in this country will be
liable to the latter only according to the German law of unfair competition,
even if it knows that its opponent's property harmed by its acts, and thus the
place of loss, is located abroad. For the question whether or not its act is
lawful . . . must in fairness be adjudged under German law as the law of
the activity. . . . Similarly, in the converse case of a Paris firm causing
difficulties to the agent of a Hamburg firm traveling in France . . . only
French rather than German law is applicable. An action considered lawful
under the law of the place of conduct must not be considered unlawful by
us. .. ." (transl.)
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generally adopted, and whether or not one might prefer to this or
any other "place of wrong" rules giving the plaintiff2"' or the
court -21 the choice between several laws, references to the last event
rule of the Restatement should be abandoned as incorrect and mis-
leading here as with regard to all other intentional torts.
(d) Alienation of Affections and Plurality of Tort Conflicts
Rules: A Sumnary. "Classification changes as the classification is
made."2 33 That recovery is possible against a manufacturer in a
"negligence" action for injuries caused by his defective products,
without proof of "privity" or personal fault, has been true since
Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."- a classified the
wheel of an automobile as a "thing of danger." This reclassification
and other adjustments of the negligence rule to new social and eco-
nomic policies have resulted in the need for new categories within
that rule, taking account of the inclusion of what I have termed lia-
bilities for "negligence without fault." - '35 In this paper I have
analyzed some of the implications of this development for the law
of conflicts, by following the "policy opproach" now so widely and
forcefully advocated by eminent writers.203 6
Early "admonitory" liability for fault was governed iy the
lex actus which the wrongdoer could most fairly be expected to
"obey." Once, however, with the growth of the hazards of modern
mechanical enterprise, liability without fault came to govern large
areas of tort law, the place of wrong lost its original meaning as
that of the defendant's conduct. Thus, when legislation imposed
absolute liability on employers, responding to the state's prevailing
compensatory interest, a new conflicts rule of workmen's compensa-
tion came to stress (under various dogmatic disguises) the law of
the plaintiff's residence or activity over that of the place of the
"wrong." And a similar shift was effected as to new common law
rules of quasi-strict liabilities within the place of wrong rule by the
substitution of the place of the plaintiff's harm for that of de-
fendant's conduct.
231. See note 102 supra.
232. See, e.g., Neuner, Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws,
20 Can. Bar Rev. 479, 486 (1942) ; Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic
Obiectives in Conflict of Laws, 43 Yale L. J. 1083, 1086 (1943).
233. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 3 (1949).
234. MacPherson v. Buick '11otor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. F-. 1050
(1916).
235. See note 1 supra.
236. See, e.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem. 47
Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933) ; Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of
Laws, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1945).
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Whether or not these primarily compensatory liabilities are
adequately served by the Restaters' place of harm rule, can be de-
cided only after further study. It may well be that this rule will
prove tenable only if reinterpreted as referring to the plaintiff's resi-
dence or center of activities as the place of harm, and as entirely
inapplicable to certain torts such as defamation or anti-trust claims.
In this paper the attempt has been made to show that whatever the
justification of the place of harm rule elsewhere, it has never been,
and should not be, applied to what has remained of the original
admonitory liability for "wrongs." The court in a multistate tort
case should ask itself, therefore, at the outset whether or not the
liability claimed would, under the forum's notion, be one primarily
aimed at a wrongdoer's admonition. If the answer is in the affirma-
tive, as will be the case regarding most intentional torts, the court
will look to the law of the place of defendant's conduct, even if the
harm complained of was sustained in domestic territory. True, if
the harmful conduct occurred outside the forum, the foreign law
might still be held inapplicable as being contrary to public policy.
But this much seems certain: wherever liability for an intentional
tort is asserted under the law of the forum as that of the place of
acting, law and reason, contrary to the Restatement, require the
forum to hold the defendant liable2'- ,3 and Judge Vyzanski in Gordon
v. Parker could have held as he did simply by finding the place of
wrong at the place of the wrongful act.
237. Additional support for this proposition could have been derived
froin Waw'zin v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. N.Y. 1935), where a
New York statute barring actions for alienation of affections was held not
to prevent the bringing of such an action in a New York federal court if
"the wrongful acts of the defendant were committed within the state of
New Jersey" (at 549). But cf. Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136
P. 2d 116 (1943).
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